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SHAREHOLDER COMPENSATION AS DIVIDEND
James J. Park*
This Article questions the prevailing view that securities-fraud
actions suffer from a circularity problem. Because shareholder
plaintiffs are owners of the defendant corporation, it is commonly
argued that shareholder compensation is a payment from share-
holders to themselves with substantial transaction costs in the form
of attorney fees. But shareholder compensation is no more circular
than a dividend, which is a cash payment to shareholders from the
company they own with substantial transaction costs in the form of
taxes. In fact, shareholder compensation is less circular than a
dividend because it is a transfer to shareholders who purchased
stock when the price was inflated by fraud from those who did not.
Shareholder compensation serves an important loss-spreading
function that is facilitated by the insurance market. Shareholder
compensation may also capture some of the benefits of paying divi-
dends, such as signaling and reducing agency costs, though it may
do so more effectively if companies could resolve securities-fraud
actions by paying a preemptive dividend.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article questions the prevailing view that securities-fraud-on-the-
market class actions alleging violations of Rule lOb-5 ("securities-fraud
actions") are fatally flawed because they suffer from a circularity problem.'
Shareholder plaintiffs are simultaneously owners of the defendant corpora-
tion from which any settlement of a securities-fraud action is paid. Thus,
when a corporation compensates shareholders for securities fraud, the
payment is seen as a circular transfer from shareholders to themselves with
substantial transaction costs in the form of attorney fees and the costs of
defending the suit.2
1. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liabilityfor Fraud on Securi-
ties Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 733-34 ("[Slome existing
shareholders are compensated at the expense of the remaining shareholders, but as plaintiffs bear
part of the cost of their own judgment."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:
An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-66 (2006) (de-
scribing the circularity problem); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous,
39 ARiz. L. REV. 497, 509 (1997) ("[A] circularity problem arises for settlements of securities class
actions .... [T]he plaintiffs necessarily provide, albeit indirectly, some portion of their own settle-
ment recovery."); Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLuM. L. REV.
237, 280-81 (2009) (describing the circularity problem); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages
for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 649 (1996) ("[M]oney paid out by the
issuer itself is essentially taken from the company's shareholders, who presumably had no direct
responsibility for ... the fraud.").
2. E.g., Ih re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 ER.D. 257, 272 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
("[S]ettlement payments ... are to equity class members little more than the shifting of wealth from
their right pocket to their left, and ... class members were to be charged a twenty percent fee by
class counsel for this 'service'...."); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities
Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1503 (1996) ("[P]ayments by the corporation to settle a class
action amount to transferring money from one pocket to the other, with about half of it dropping on
the floor for lawyers to pick up."); Adam C. Pritchard, 'Basic'Error is Focus on Loss, NAT'L L.J.,
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But this circularity is no worse than the circularity of a dividend,3 which
is a common way that corporations distribute cash to their shareholders. The
economic benefit of a dividend is at best a wash because the cash that is
paid out cannot be invested by the corporation, or the corporation must issue
new debt or equity to fund the dividend. The prospect of receiving a divi-
dend should thus be irrelevant to an investor's decision to purchase a stock.
And like shareholder compensation, a dividend triggers a substantial
4transaction cost, the dividend tax.
Indeed, shareholder compensation is actually less circular than a
dividend. While all shareholders receive a dividend, only shareholders who
purchased stock while it was inflated by fraud are entitled to shareholder
compensation. Shareholder compensation is thus essentially a transfer from
shareholders who were not defrauded to shareholders who were defrauded.
In light of this transfer, shareholder compensation is best justified as a loss-
spreading mechanism that spreads the risk of buying stock at inflated prices.
This loss-spreading function is facilitated by insurance, which ensures that
even shareholders who benefited from the fraud by selling stock at inflated
prices contribute to funding shareholder compensation. A system that relies
on insurance is likely to be more effective in spreading losses from fraud
than a system that relies solely on investors to diversify.
The circularity problem should also be viewed in light of the significant
body of finance literature that explores why companies pay dividends
Sept. 22, 2008, at 26 ("Shareholders effectively take a dollar from one pocket, pay about half of that
dollar to lawyers on both sides, and then put the leftover change in their other pocket."); Milberg
Weiss: The Boot's on the Other Foot, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2006, at 72 ("The company would typi-
cally settle, in effect compensating shareholders with their own money-a slice of which went to
Milberg Weiss.").
3. This Article is not the first to liken shareholder compensation to a dividend. See, e.g.,
Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1421, 1444 (1994) ("If the issuer makes the [shareholder compensation] payment, however, it is in
effect a dividend." (citing Patricia J. Hughes & Anjan V. Thakor, Litigation Risk, Intermediation and
the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 5 REv. FIN. STUD. 709 (1992))); Statement of Joseph
A. Grundfest to the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2 (Feb. 4, 2008)
("Any settlement or judgment paid by the corporation has the effect of a mandatory dividend that is
likely to reduce the market value of the issuer's shares."), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
offices/domestic-finance/acap/submissions/02042008/GrundfestO2O42008.pdf. But this Article is the
first to extensively analyze the issue and contend that some of the arguments used to explain divi-
dends might have applicability to the issue of whether shareholder compensation is justified.
4. Because dividends were taxed as ordinary income by the federal government before
2003, e.g., Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of
Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (2007) ("Until 2003, investors paid tax on both interest
and dividends at ordinary income rates."), the tax rate on dividends for individuals in the highest tax
bracket has been well over 50 percent. See Robert A. Wilson, Personal Exemptions and Individual
Income Tax Rates, 1913-2002, I.R.S. STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 2002, at 216, 219-20 (com-
piling historical individual income-tax rates), available at http://ftp.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02inpetr.pdf.
December 2009]
Michigan Law Review
despite their circularity, a problem referred to as the dividend puzzle. Three
explanations have been articulated for the payment of dividends. First, pay-
ment of a dividend sends a signal to the market about the company's future
prospects. Second, payment of a dividend may reduce agency costs by
reducing free cash flow that might be wasted by managers. Third, payment
of a dividend allows shareholders to further diversify.
Of these theories, the agency-costs explanation is most applicable to
shareholder compensation. If a company does not have insurance, paying
shareholder compensation can significantly reduce the amount of free cash
flow available to managers who committed fraud. If a company does have
insurance, the costs of shareholder compensation are spread out over time,
but such costs may have a disciplining effect similar to debt. While in prac-
tice it is unlikely that reducing free cash flow is always beneficial to a
company, the circularity problem must come to terms with the possibility
that reducing free cash flow may reduce agency costs.
The remaining explanations for the payment of dividends apply with
less force to the context of shareholder compensation. Rather than signaling
that a company is doing well, shareholder compensation signals that a com-
pany may have committed fraud. Thus, managers have an incentive to
obscure the signal of any shareholder compensation payment. Because
shareholders typically receive compensation only for a fraction of their
losses, any diversification effect of shareholder compensation is likely to be
trivial.
However, the impact of shareholder compensation as a signal might be
enhanced by changing the distribution mechanism of shareholder compensa-
tion so it more closely resembles a dividend. Corporations, acting through a
committee of independent directors, could be permitted to preemptively pay
a dividend that would cover some or all of the cost of the fraud to share-
holders. Plaintiffs' attorneys would receive a fee only if they recover an
amount greater than the preemptive dividend, reducing the transaction cost
of attorney fees and creating incentives to recover more for shareholders. A
preemptive dividend would send a much stronger signal that the corporation
treats fraud seriously than payment of a settlement by an insurance com-
pany.
The wide acceptance of the circularity problem has led to skepticism
about whether securities-fraud actions fulfill a meaningful compensatory
function.6 As a result, there have been a significant number of proposals to
5. In contrast, there have been few treatments of dividend policy in the legal literature.
Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 884 (1995) ("[T]he body of legal
literature on dividend policy is sparse ....").
6. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301,
1302-03 (2008) ("Most commentators now agree that the private right of action implied under See-
[Vol. 108:323
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revamp them.7 Ultimately, thinking of shareholder compensation as a divi-
dend by itself is not enough to establish that securities-fraud actions are
desirable for policy reasons. Indeed, it may be impossible to conclusively
determine whether the benefits of shareholder compensation-loss spread-
ing and reduction of agency costs--outweigh the substantial transaction
costs of litigation.
But at the very least, the analogy shows that shareholder compensation
should not be rejected on circularity grounds. Neutralizing the circularity
problem will mean that deterrence will not have to play such a heavy role in
justifying securities-fraud actions. The arguments for reform should shift
from totally restructuring or even doing away with securities-fraud actions
to incremental reforms such as continuing to clarify the law so that merito-
rious claims are more likely to survive while nonmeritorious claims can be
screened out at the motion to dismiss stage by judges.'
Part I of this Article describes the circularity problem. Part II describes
the dividend puzzle and demonstrates that shareholder compensation is ac-
tually less circular than a dividend and serves an important loss-spreading
function that is facilitated by the insurance markets. Part III examines
whether some of the arguments justifying dividends, such as signaling and
the reduction of agency costs, may be relevant to the payment of share-
holder compensation. Part IV proposes that some of the signaling benefits of
dividends might be better captured if companies had the option of distribut-
ing shareholder compensation through a preemptive dividend.
tion 10(b) ... cannot be defended on compensatory grounds, at least in its most common form: the
fraud-on-the market class action brought against a nontrading issuer.").
Despite the academic skepticism, Congress has expressed support for the idea that compensa-
tion is an important goal for securities-fraud actions. For example, section 308 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act allows the SEC to distribute funds collected as penalties to harmed investors. 15 U.S.C.
§ 7246 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note I (proposing that vicarious liability for securities
fraud be replaced with a rule that focuses on agent liability); Richard A. Booth, The End of the Se-
curities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1 (2007) (proposing that liability
for securities fraud be limited to insiders who enrich themselves through false disclosures); Coffee,
supra note I (proposing elimination of vicarious liability for securities-fraud actions); Alicia Davis
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223 (2007) (proposing creation of investor
compensation fund): Fox, supra note 1 (proposing that certifying investment banks rather than issu-
ers should be liable for securities fraud); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
727 (1995) (proposing that the SEC use rulemaking to define the boundaries of liability for securi-
ties-fraud action); Rose, supra note 6 (proposing that the SEC play an oversight role in screening
securities-fraud actions).
8. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 7, at 728 ("[T]he appropriate policy response is to search




I. THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM
In theory, securities-fraud actions compensate investors when they pur-
chase stock at prices inflated by fraud, while deterring corporations and
their agents from committing fraud.9 Though the deterrence rationale is
largely accepted,'o most scholars have concluded that securities-fraud ac-
tions are inherently unable to compensate investors because of a circularity
problem. "
While the precise form of the argument varies and is usually mentioned
only in passing, the circularity problem generally criticizes securities-fraud
actions as resulting in meaningless transfers from a company to its share-
holders." There are two variants of the circularity problem. The first is that
shareholder compensation is circular because shareholders receive a pay-
ment from the corporation they own, which reduces funds that the
corporation could use to make investments that might benefit those share-
holders.'3 In other words, the shareholder victims of the fraud pay for their
9. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (noting that securities-
fraud actions deter fraud and protect investors from losses caused by misrepresentations); Randall v.
Loftsgaardan, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (noting that securities laws were intended not only to com-
pensate investors but to deter fraud); Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Even
in situations where an investor is not free from blame, private damage actions under these antifraud
and antimanipulation provisions serve not only to compensate injured investors, but also to deter
fraud and manipulation by exposing those contemplating unlawful conduct to the threat of private
damage liability."); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981).
10. Though, there is skepticism about whether the current regime is effective in deterring
securities fraud. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1536-37, 1548-56 (arguing that while securities-
fraud actions are needed for deterrence, the current liability structure fails to deter managers who are
the primary initiators and beneficiaries of fraud).
11. See supra note 1.
12. Another variant of the circularity problem exists in the context of derivative litigation. If
directors and officers are indemnified for judgments in derivative actions, such a payment would be
circular because the corporation would both make and receive that payment. Thus, states such as
Delaware limit indemnification for judgments relating to derivative actions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(a)-(b) (2001); see also Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 n.18 (Del.
1996); Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of
Details Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147,
1165 n.58 (2006).
13. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1. Another variant of this argument is that shareholder
compensation is a circular distribution from current shareholders to selling shareholders. See, e.g.,
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1505; Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for De-
frauded Investors?, 63 Bus. LAw. 317, 331 (2008) ("The effect is to take corporate funds away from
one group of investors, the current shareholders, and pay it to another group of investors, those who
traded in the securities during the class damages period."); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 921 ("[S]ettlements often benefit
former shareholders at the expense of current ones. In effect, they can amount to little more than a
transfer payment with enormously high transaction costs in the form of a large contingency fee
award.").
[Vol. 108:323
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own remedy. 4 The second is that shareholder compensation is circular be-
cause diversified shareholders over time do not suffer harm from fraud
because, while they may be victims of fraud with respect to some transac-
tions, they may be beneficiaries of fraud with respect to other transactions.'5
Both variants essentially criticize shareholder compensation on the ground
that it involves a transfer with benefits that do not outweigh the substantial
transaction cost of attorney fees. "
The circularity problem arises in part because while the corporation is
usually the primary defendant in a securities-fraud action, it arguably does
not directly commit the fraud or realize the gains from the fraud. 7 Typically,
any gains from the fraud are captured by the shareholders who sold shares
while the stock was inflated. Thus, the corporation cannot simply refund
gains from the fraud.' If it does not have insurance, it must pay shareholder
compensation from its cash flow or issue additional debt or equity to fund
the payment.19
14. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1562 ("[I]n the case of at least the 'secondary market'
securities class action, the victims and the shareholders are largely the same .... ).
15. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985) ("An investor with a diversified portfolio will be the
hidden gainer in a [fraudulent] transaction ... as often as he will be a loser."); A.C. Pritchard, Mar-
kets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions With Exchanges as Securities Fraud
Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 939 (1999) ("In fraud on the market, for every shareholder who
bought at a fraudulently inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The buyer's individual loss is
offset by the seller's gain."). There is some empirical support for this argument. A study found that
institutional investors break even from investments in companies where there is securities fraud and
may even come out ahead. However, the study acknowledged that individuals who are not diversi-
fied are at substantial risk of losses. ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, THE EcONOMIc REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/sponsors/docs/2005-securities.pdf. But see Evans, supra note 7, at
234-35 (arguing that many investors are not diversified).
16. Plaintiffs' attorney fees for securities-fraud actions are at levels typical for contingency
cases. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 50 (2004) (finding plaintiffs' attorney fees in
securities-fraud actions average 25% of recovery). Defense costs may be lower but are still substan-
tial, perhaps reflecting the need to hire sophisticated counsel. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The
Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1795, 1815 (2007) (citing estimates of defense costs of 25-35%, but concluding that average
defense costs are likely to be about 11% of recovery); Coffee, supra note 1, at 1546 n.38 (discussing
the findings of Baker & Griffith and observing that their 11% estimate seems low).
17. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1556-66.
18. In contrast, suits brought under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933, where the alle-
gation is that the corporation committed fraud with respect to a securities issuance, have not been
questioned on circularity grounds. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1556-57 (limiting criticism of
securities compensation to "fraud on the market" suits). In a section I I case, the corporation alleg-
edly realizes gains from the fraud because it raises more funds than it could have without the fraud.
A section II case essentially seeks a refund of those fraudulent gains.
19. The circularity problem can be avoided when shareholders recover from the directors and
officers of the corporation or third parties involved with the fraud. A number of commentators have
persuasively argued that a system where agents are held liable is theoretically preferable to the
current system where the corporation is vicariously liable. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 1
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This dynamic can be illustrated by examining a typical securities-fraud
action. Suppose a corporation lies about its financial results, materially in-
flating its stock for a period. When the fraud is revealed, the market
punishes the corporation by reducing the price of its stock.2 0 Any stock-price
decline is likely to have at least three components. 2 ' First, the stock will go
down to its "true" value based on accurate information about the company.
For example, the market might have to reduce its projections of the future
cash flows of the company if those projections were inflated by fraud. As a
result, the intrinsic or fundamental value of the stock as calculated by dis-
2counted cash-flow models should be lower and the stock price will decline.
Call this a "Fundamental Decline." Second, after a fraud is revealed, the
21market may no longer trust the corporation's management to tell the truth.
The market might then discount the stock to take into account this loss of
credibility. 24 Call this a "Credibility Decline." Third, the stock will decline to
take into account the costs of compensating shareholders and defending a
securities-fraud action brought under Rule lOb-5. Call this a "10b-5 De-
cline. 25
(arguing that vicarious liability for securities fraud should be replaced with enforcement against
agents); Coffee, supra note 1 (same). But such a system has not arisen for a number of reasons.
First, directors and officers do not typically have the resources to compensate investors for a signifi-
cant portion of their losses. Second, it can be expensive and difficult to apportion liability among
individual directors and managers. Finally, as a doctrinal matter, it is difficult for shareholders to
recover against third parties who aided or abetted the fraud. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,182 (1994).
20. One study finds that some of this decline comes on the date the lawsuit is filed, while
part of it comes before the filing date in anticipation of the suit. Amar Gande & Craig M. Lewis,
Shareholder Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers, J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891028.
21. Of course, some of the price decline might be attributed to additional factors. See Baruch
Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy
Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 10 (1994) ("In crashes, extraneous factors-such as the type of people
investing in a stock, how much information they have, the prevalence of automatic trading mecha-
nisms and hedging (such as programmed trading or stop-loss orders), and the ability of specialists
on the trading floor to provide liquidity-greatly affect a stock's price.").
22. For an explanation of how fundamental value is calculated, see RICHARD A. BREALEY ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 85-106 (9th ed. 2008); MCKINSEY & COMPANY, ET AL.,
VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 101-31 (4th ed. 2005).
23. This decline can be extremely significant. One study estimates that on average, for finan-
cial misstatements, the decline is 7.5 times the size of the legal penalties imposed on the company.
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=652121.
24. If securities-fraud actions are perceived to be without merit, the "Credibility Decline" is
likely to be small. There is some evidence that for directors, the reputational effect of fraud allega-
tions is minimal. See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities
Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 1435 ("To the extent that investors predict that
litigation will follow an adverse disclosure, the market's reaction to the disclosure will include not
only its valuation of the information disclosed, but also the anticipated direct and indirect costs of
[Vol. 108:323
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There are at least two categories of shareholders who are affected by the
fraud. First, there are former shareholders who benefited from the fraud. A
shareholder may have purchased the stock before the stock was inflated and
sold at the inflated price at a profit before the fraud was revealed. Call these
shareholders the "Benefiting Shareholders." Second, there are shareholders
who are damaged by the fraud because they did not sell before the fraud was
revealed. These shareholders suffer from some or all of the Fundamental,
Credibility, and lOb-5 Declines. Call these shareholders "Damaged Share-
holders ."2
We can further classify the Damaged Shareholders into two subcatego-
ries. First, there are Damaged Shareholders who buy at the inflated price
within the class period and can recover through a securities-fraud action.
Call these shareholders "Class Shareholders." A Class Shareholder is enti-
tled to recover "actual damages," that is, an amount equal to the purchase
price minus the true "value" of the stock absent the fraud.27 The Class
Shareholder is clearly entitled to compensation for the Fundamental De-
cline, and is arguably entitled to recover for the Credibility and l0b-5
Declines.28
litigation over the disclosure."). As Richard Booth argues, a lOb-5 Decline increases potential re-
coverable damages, which in turn could create a feedback effect that further increases the 1Ob-5
Decline. See Booth, supra note 7, at 19-23. But the size of the feedback effect may be minimal if
the market values the stock using fundamental analysis based on its future earnings or dividends.
See sources cited supra note 22. If the market perceives the costs associated with a securities-fraud
action as a one-time, nonrecurring cost, then shareholder compensation should not significantly
affect the future cash flows of the company. See, e.g., James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of
Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513, 539-41 (2009) (citing literature indicating that the
market tends to discount one-time events in valuing a stock).
26. Of course, there are shareholders who are unaffected by the fraud. A shareholder may
have both purchased and sold stock within the period when the stock was inflated.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006). According to the United States Supreme Court, the "'correct
measure of damages ... is the difference between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received
and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.'" Randall
v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)); see also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,
1342 (9th Cir. 1976).
28. The law is unclear as to the precise meaning of "actual damages." See Robert B. Thomp-
son, "Simplicity and Certainty" in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 Bus. LAW. 1177,
1179 (1996). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") limits any recovery
to the difference between the purchase price and the average trading price of the security ninety days
after a corrective disclosure, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006), but neglects to provide much substantive
guidance as to damages. Thompson, supra, at 1177-78.
The legislative history to the PSLRA suggests that damages should include "losses caused by
the fraud and not by other market conditions." H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. Commentators have differed as to whether lOb-5 De-
clines might be considered "losses caused by fraud." Compare Alexander, supra note 3, at 1434
(implying that lOb-5 Decline is not recoverable), with Booth, supra note 7, at 8 (implying that lOb-5
Decline is recoverable). Also, it is unclear whether the Credibility Decline is caused by the fraudu-
lent statement, or would be considered a subsequent market event.
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Second, there are Damaged Shareholders who bought the stock before
the stock was inflated by the fraud. Because these shareholders did not pur-
chase stock during the period of the fraud, they are not in the class of
shareholders who might recover through a securities-fraud action. While
these shareholders do not suffer the Fundamental Decline, they suffer from
the Credibility and lOb-5 Declines. Call these shareholders "Non-Class
Shareholders. ' 9
The circularity problem arises partly from the fact that the law does not
provide for recovery from the Benefiting Shareholders." The Benefiting
Shareholders who capture the benefits of the fraud are not required to refund
those benefits to the Damaged Shareholders. 3 ' And this is not necessarily an
unfair result, as the Benefiting Shareholders usually have nothing to do with
the fraud.32 As a result, any shareholder compensation must come from the
corporation, which is owned by the Damaged Shareholders (both Class and• 31
Non-Class), who therefore pay for the shareholder compensation.
The situation is worst for Non-Class Shareholders. These shareholders
fund shareholder compensation but do not receive any payment because
they purchased stock outside of the class period. While Non-Class Share-
holders had the opportunity to benefit from the fraud by selling their shares,
they did not and so are left holding the bag. Non-Class Shareholders did not
commit any fraud, suffer from the Credibility and lOb-5 Declines, yet they
must bear the costs of compensating the Class Shareholders.34
29. Like Class Shareholders, some Non-Class Shareholders sell and others hold onto their
stock.
30. Alexander, supra note 2, at 1497-98 (noting that Benefiting Shareholders are "not re-
quired to refund their windfalls"); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 639-40
("Because the sellers are no longer investors in this firm, and because there are bystander-investors,
a payment of damages by the firm would not be a wash. Damages computed on the basis of the
investors who purchased [on the basis of fraud] would greatly exceed the optimal sanction.").
31. Because of the Credibility and l0b-5 Declines, the amount that the Benefiting Share-
holders benefit by (usually equal to the Fundamental Decline) is likely to be less than the losses to
investors. Evans, supra note 7, at 229 (arguing that the losses of investors are likely to be greater
than gains of investors on winning side).
32. Of course, there will be cases where some of the Benefiting Shareholders are insiders
who know of the fraud and sell. A securities-fraud action might recover those gains directly from
such parties, either on an insider-trading theory, or if the insider participated in the fraud, a securi-
ties-fraud action.
33. Some Damaged Shareholders will sell before shareholder compensation is actually paid.
They still contribute to shareholder compensation in that the stock they sold is discounted by the
l0b-5 Decline.
34. Lawrence Mitchell questions the assumption that such shareholders should be seen as
"innocent." Given the trend toward shareholder empowerment, there is a case for making sharehold-
ers accountable for failures in corporate governance. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent
Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits,
2009 Wis. L. REv. 243, 287-91.
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II. THE DIVIDEND PUZZLE AND SHAREHOLDER COMPENSATION
For decades, financial economists have tried to explain why corporations
pay dividends, a problem commonly known as the "dividend puzzle."35 A
dividend, in essence, is a transfer of cash from the corporation to its
shareholders." Many corporations pay a regular dividend, distributing a
fixed amount on a periodic basis. In addition, a dividend can also be a
one-time event, or "special dividend."37 A dividend is typically paid to all
shareholders, though a corporation can also issue preferred stock that enti-
tles the holder to a "preferred dividend" that must be paid before common
shareholders can receive a dividend.3"
Like shareholder compensation, dividends have a circularity problem.
Because shareholders own the assets from which a dividend is paid, share-
holders fund their own dividend. In addition, a dividend incurs a substantial
transaction cost, the dividend tax. Given this similarity, it is useful to com-
pare the circularity of shareholder compensation with the circularity of a
dividend. Close examination reveals that shareholder compensation is less
circular than a dividend. Shareholder compensation is a transfer from Non-
Class to Class Shareholders that serves a loss-spreading function that is
facilitated by insurance.
A. The Irrelevance of Dividends
Dividends are puzzling because they should be at best irrelevant to an
investor's decision to purchase a stock. 9 In a world without taxes or other
35. See, e.g., Fischer Black, The dividend puzzle, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1976, at 5
(concluding that literature does not provide compelling explanation for dividend payments).
36. Open-market repurchases of the corporation's own stock have similar effects as divi-
dends. By increasing demand for the firm's shares, such repurchases might increase the firm's stock
price. But the repurchases must be financed from the firm's own capital, reducing the amount of
capital that could be invested on behalf of shareholders. See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend
Puzzle, 93 GEo. L.J. 845 (2005). In addition to buying its own shares in the market, a company can
make a repurchase tender offer, where the company offers a fixed price for shares, usually at a pre-
mium over the market price. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase
Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 421 (2000).
37. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 444 (describing special dividend); Bratton, supra note
36, at 877 (same). Special dividends are now rarely paid by companies. See Harry DeAngelo et al.,
Special Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 310 (2000)
("[Slpecial dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms but have gradually disappeared
over the last 40 to 45 years and are now a rare phenomenon.").
38. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 396; Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Un-
derstanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116
HARv. L. REV. 874, 882 (2003) ("Put simply, a dividend preference in favor of preferred stock pro-
hibits the payment of a common dividend before the payment of a preferred dividend.").
39. See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation
of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961); see also Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66
VA. L. REV. 85, 86-87 (1980) (describing irrelevance theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two
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transaction costs, a shareholder should not care whether a company pays a
dividend. The benefit of any dividend received by the shareholder is offset
by the reduction in the company's cash, which could have been invested by
the company, or by the cost of the debt or stock issued by the corporation to
finance the dividend. In other words, the economic benefit of the dividend to
shareholders is neutralized by the company's cost of paying the dividend.
Moreover, a shareholder can always create its own dividend by selling stock,
converting any capital gains into cash. Thus, a rational shareholder should
not pay more for a stock that pays a dividend than the shareholder pays for
an equivalent stock that does not pay a dividend.
If the firm's expected return from investing its capital is greater than the
firm's cost of capital, it might be irrational for an investor to prefer a divi-
dend. Investors would benefit if the firm invested its capital and earned a
higher return than if they received cash in the form of a dividend. If they
received cash, they might not be able to reinvest the cash and achieve the
same return. Of course, investors can always simply reinvest the dividend in
the company's stock, but there are substantial transaction costs to receiving
a dividend, most notably taxes.
Given the reality that dividends are taxed, there should be less of an in-
centive to pay dividends.4 ' A shareholder who receives a dividend must
immediately pay a tax, while the shareholder would not pay taxes on any
appreciation in the stock until it sells the stock. Until the Jobs and Growth
42Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which set the dividend tax rate at
15 percent,43 dividends were taxed as income at rates substantially higherS 44
than the tax paid on capital gains. At times, marginal income tax rates have
been quite high, approaching well over 50 percent.45 The reduction in divi-
dend tax mandated by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003 is set to expire in 2010, meaning that unless the reduction is reenacted,
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650, 650 (1984) (same); Daniel R.
Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699, 701-02 (1981) (same).
40. Bratton, supra note 36, at 861.
41. See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend
Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns, I J. FIN. EcoN. 1, 1-2 (1974) ("[T]he existence of
differential taxes on income and capital gains should make the shares of corporations that pay low
dividends more desirable, and thus a corporation can increase the value of its shares by reducing its
payout ratio.").
42. Pub. L. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
43. 26 U.S.C. § l(h)(l1) (2006).
44. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 4, at 509-10. Prior to 1986, there was a significant difference.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 equalized the tax rates on dividend and capital gains, but the gap reap-
peared in 1992. See Aswath Damodaran, Dividends and Taxes: An Analysis of the Bush Dividend
Tax Plan 4 (March 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/
-adamodar/pdfiles/papers/divtaxes.pdf.
45. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 216, 219-20.
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it is quite possible that dividend taxes will increase.4 ' Thus, shareholders
have paid and may continue to pay a higher tax on a dividend than if they
created their own dividend by selling shares that appreciated in value.
Despite their costs, dividends are paid by a substantial number of compa-
nies.47 And despite their supposed irrelevance, stocks are commonly valued
using what is known as the dividend-discount model, which posits that the
48
value of a stock is equal to the present value of its future dividend payments.
A number of studies have established that dividend payments in the aggregate
are associated with growth in stock prices.49 Moreover, a substantial number
of investors prefer stocks that pay dividends over those that do not.50 Thus,
while positing the irrelevance of dividends, the finance literature cannot get
away from the reality that dividends do matter.
B. The Relevance of Shareholder Compensation
Though dividends are arguably irrelevant because of their complete cir-
cularity, shareholder compensation is not as circular as a dividend. While
generally all shareholders receive a dividend payment, only Class
Shareholders receive shareholder compensation.5 ' Thus, shareholder com-
pensation is largely funded by Non-Class Shareholders. Unlike a dividend,
the problem with shareholder compensation is not so much its circularity,
but that Non-Class Shareholders bear the cost of the transfer. Defending
shareholder compensation requires a theory for why such a transfer is justi-
fied.
46. See, e.g., Dwight Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L. REV. 123, 174
(2008) (noting that dividend tax could increase after 2010).
47. However, it appears that the percentage of companies paying dividends has significantly
declined from over 60% to about 40% over the last thirty years. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22,
at 443; see also Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm
Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 22 (2001) (finding proportion of
industrial companies paying dividends declined from 60% to 20%).
48. The leading corporate-finance textbook utilizes this model. BREALEY ET AL., supra note
22, at 88-97.
49. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell & Robert Shiller, Stock Prices, Earnings, and Expected Divi-
dends, 43 J. FIN. 661 (1988) (finding that historical averages of earnings predict future dividends).
50. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 456.
51. Another difference may be that dividends tend to be consistent while shareholder com-
pensation is a one-time payment. In terms of frequency, shareholder compensation may be more
similar to open-market repurchases of a stock, which tend to be sporadic. See Murali Jagannathan et
al., Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases, 57 J. FIN.
EcON. 355 (2000) (finding that dividends are paid consistently from "permanent" operating cash
flows while repurchases are made periodically by firms with "temporary" nonoperating cash flows).
December 2009]
Michigan Law Review
1. Shareholder Compensation as Transfer from
Non-Class to Class Shareholders
While Class Shareholders fund their own compensation, they only do so
in part. That is because Non-Class Shareholders also contribute to the
shareholder-compensation payment but are not entitled to receive a share of
that payment. Class Shareholders receive more than they put in, compensat-
ing them in part for their loss. Shareholder compensation benefits Class
Shareholders more than a capital investment with those same funds, because
the return from any capital investment is divided with Non-Class Sharehold-
ers while shareholder compensation is not.
To put it more concretely, suppose a company has ten shareholders, each
with one share. The company distributes a total of $10 in dividends, with
each shareholder receiving $1. The payment is circular. The benefit of the
$1 dividend is offset by the shareholder's $1 pro rata share of the cost of the
dividend.
Now suppose there is a securities fraud resulting in a Fundamental De-
cline of $2 per share. Five shareholders are Class Shareholders while five
shareholders are Non-Class Shareholders. To compensate them for the Fun-
damental Decline, the company distributes $2 in shareholder compensation
to each of the five Class Shareholders, resulting in a total payment of $10 to
the Class Shareholders. The payment is not circular. While the shareholder-
compensation payment costs each shareholder (both Class and Non-Class)
$1, the Class Shareholders receive $2, while the Non-Class Shareholders
receive $0. The Class Shareholder suffered a $2 Fundamental Decline, con-
tributes $1 in shareholder compensation, and receives $2 in shareholder
compensation-resulting in a net loss of $1. The Non-Class Shareholder
suffered a $0 Fundamental Decline, contributes $1 in shareholder compen-
sation, and receives $0 in shareholder compensation-resulting in a net loss
of $1. The impact of shareholder compensation can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Fundamental Contribution to ShareholderShareholder Compensation Net LossCompensation Received
Class
Shareholder $2 $1 $2 $1
Non-Class
Shareholder $0 $1 $0 $1
[Vol. 108:323
Shareholder Compensation as Dividend
In theory, shareholder compensation spreads the loss from the fraud so
that each shareholder bears $1 of lOss.52 Without shareholder compensation,
the Class Shareholder would bear the entire $2 loss from the Fundamental
Decline while the Non-Class Shareholder suffers no loss. Thus, shareholder
compensation is not just a circular payment but can serve to spread share-
holder losses from fraud.
To some extent, the degree of circularity of the payment will depend on
the ratio of Class to Non-Class Shareholders. When the number of Class and
Non-Class Shareholders is equal, $0.50 of every dollar in shareholder com-
pensation received by the Class Shareholder comes from the contributions
of the Class Shareholders. When there are fewer Class Shareholders than
Non-Class Shareholders, the shareholder compensation will be less circular.
If there is one Class Shareholder for every nine Non-Class Shareholders,
only $0.10 of every dollar in shareholder compensation received by the
Class Shareholder comes from its own contribution. When there are more
Class Shareholders than Non-Class Shareholders, the payment will be more
circular. If there are nine Class Shareholders for every one Non-Class
Shareholder, $0.90 of every dollar of shareholder compensation received by
the Class Shareholder comes from the contributions of the Class Sharehold-
ers.53 While the degree of circularity will vary based on the ratio of Class to
Non-Class Shareholders, unless every shareholder is a Class Shareholder,
shareholder compensation will be less circular than a dividend.
Admittedly, the compensatory effect of shareholder compensation may
be offset by the transaction costs of securities-fraud actions as reflected by
the l0b-5 Decline. In our earlier example, suppose there is a 10b-5 Decline
of $1 after the fraud has been revealed. If the Class Shareholder who suf-
fered a net loss of $1 with shareholder compensation suffers an additional
loss of $1 from the 10b-5 Decline, the Class Shareholder suffers a net loss
of $2. The Class Shareholder is in the same position as it would be in a
52. Loss spreading occurs even when insurance covers the shareholder-compensation pay-
ment. While all shareholders bear the costs of insurance premiums, only Class Shareholders receive
the insurance payout.
53. Because most frauds occur over discrete time periods, it may be more likely that there
will be fewer Class Shareholders than Non-Class Shareholders. On the other hand, one article ar-
gues that it is likely that Class Shareholders will outnumber Non-Class Shareholders:
Because of the high volume of shares traded on the national stock exchanges, the number of
shares in the potential plaintiff class is likely to exceed the number of shares held by the de-
fendant shareholders. Accordingly, it is likely that the number of victims exceeds the number
of the defendant firm's shareholders, in which case the loss spreading argument implies that
losses should remain with the victims.
Arlen & Carney, supra note 1, at 719. However, the study acknowledges that it is difficult to know
the ratio of Class to Non-Class Shareholders because many securities-fraud actions do not specify
the exact dimensions of the Class. See id. at 731 ("Fraud on the Market cases are class actions and
the plaintiffs, at the time the suit is filed, do not know the size of the class or the potential damages
for each class member.").
December 20091
Michigan Law Review
world without shareholder compensation where it bears all of the cost of a
$2 Fundamental Decline.
But it is unlikely that the 10b-5 Decline will be significant enough to
completely offset the benefit of shareholder compensation. First, as a practi-
cal matter, as will be explained below, most companies have insurance that
covers the costs of 10b-5 litigation, meaning that 10b-5 costs (primarily in-
surance premiums) should already be capitalized in the stock price. Second,
while 10b-5 costs may be significant if the company does not have insur-
ance, it is unlikely that they will affect more than one financial period, and
thus should not significantly affect the future cash flows that determine the
valuation of a stock.5 4 Thus, the 10b-5 Decline is unlikely to completely off-
set the benefit of shareholder compensation.
2. Distinguishing Between Non-Class and Class Shareholders
Despite the fact that shareholder compensation is not entirely circular,
critics object that it is unfair to transfer funds from Non-Class Shareholders
who had nothing to do with the fraud to Class Shareholders.55 Non-Class
Shareholders essentially fund a dividend to Class Shareholders. In order to
defend shareholder compensation, there must be a basis for having share-
holders who did not participate in the fraud bear the cost of securities fraud.
As an initial matter, it is important to observe that the transfer from
Non-Class to Class Shareholder is the result of a doctrinal compromise. In
56
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme Court held that only
a purchaser or seller of a security has a private cause of action under Rule
1Ob-5 5 7 Thus, even though Non-Class Shareholders suffer from the Credi-
bility and 10b-5 Declines, because they did not purchase or sell securities
during the relevant time period, they cannot recover through a securities-
fraud action.
The Court noted that it limited Rule 10b-5 in this particular way because
of "policy considerations." Without the limit set by Blue Chip, the potential
liability for any securities fraud would be unmanageable. 59 It would be diffi-
cult to calculate the precise harm to Non-Class Shareholders who did not
purchase or sell securities during the class period. Thus, while there is an
intuitive unfairness to transfers from Non-Class to Class Shareholders, that
54. See Park, supra note 25, at 539-41.
55. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1557 ("[Slecurities litigation in this context inherently
results in a wealth transfer between two classes of public shareholders-those in the class period
and those outside it-and typically neither class is culpable.").
56. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
57. Id. at 754-55.
58. Id. at 737.
59. See id. at 746-47.
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state of affairs is a result of a considered doctrinal give and take, rather than
an arbitrary decision to impose costs on Non-Class Shareholders.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for financing decisions to favor some
shareholders over othersi5 For example, when a company issues new shares
of stock, existing shareholders may find that their stake in the company is
diluted.6' Open market repurchases, where the company purchases its own
stock, may favor selling shareholders over holding shareholders if the com-
61pany purchases at a time when the stock is overvalued. In principle,
shareholder compensation may be no worse than other tactics that benefit
some shareholders at the expense of others.
The transfer from Non-Class Shareholders to Class Shareholders is best
justified on the ground that Class Shareholders suffered from a Fundamental
Decline, while the Non-Class Shareholders did not. While both Class and
Non-Class Shareholders suffer from the Credibility and lOb-5 Declines,
only Class Shareholders suffer the harm of purchasing stock at a price that
does not reflect its true value. Fundamental Declines reflect the main harm
of securities fraud, that markets are fooled into miscalculating the value of a
stock. If the securities-fraud statutes are tied to the promotion of markets
that price shares accurately, the law should focus on remedying fraud that
prevents accurate pricing. Moreover, while Credibility and lOb-5 Declines
might dissipate if management responds appropriately to the fraud, a Fun-
damental Decline is more likely to persist because it reflects a basic
adjustment in the way the market should value a stock.
The main inequity that arises from requiring Non-Class Shareholders to
compensate Class Shareholders is that both suffer from Credibility and lOb-
5 Declines but only Class Shareholders might be compensated for such de-
clines. 6' But because most cases settle, and settlement funds do not specify
which declines are being compensated, it is unclear that Class Shareholders
are actually being compensated for Credibility and lOb-5 Declines. Any
potential inequity relating to Credibility and lOb-5 Declines could be reme-
died by limiting the damages received by Class Shareholders to an amount
equal to the Fundamental Decline, as some have already argued.64
60. See generally Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1288-90 (2008) (noting that conflicts can arise when activist shareholders
invest in various parts of a corporation's capital structure).
61. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 5, at 913.
62. See Bratton, supra note 36, at 889. Of course, if the company purchases stock at a time
when the stock is undervalued, such repurchases may benefit current shareholders.
63. As discussed earlier, this is a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip
Stamps. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
64. See Lev & de Villiers, supra note 21. By limiting damages to the Fundamental Decline,
securities-fraud actions would avoid the feedback effect that might occur by compensating share-
holders for lOb-5 Declines. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 7.
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While Non-Class Shareholders are not directly responsible for commit-
ting securities fraud, they also do not commit the corporate torts or
regulatory violations that result in damages and penalties for which share-
holders commonly bear the cost. While it is unfair to single out Non-Class
Shareholders when Benefiting Shareholders, who also do not suffer from the
Fundamental Decline, contribute nothing,6' as will be discussed more below,
some of this concern is mitigated by the fact that many companies purchase
insurance for securities-fraud actions.
3. The Loss-Spreading Function of Shareholder Compensation
The transfer from Non-Class to Class Shareholders serves as a form of
loss spreading.6 While loss spreading has been widely discussed as a justifi-
cation for compensating victims of torts,67 it has not been recently defended• 61
in the context of shareholder compensation, largely because of the percep-
tion that shareholders can spread losses from fraud through diversification.
a. The Limits of Diversification
A common argument against the need for shareholder compensation is
that investors can mitigate losses through diversification. 9 The impact of
fraud by any particular firm should be minimal for a diversified investor.
While a diversified investor might end up purchasing stock inflated by
65. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 1497-98.
66. This Article is not the first to note that shareholder compensation serves a loss-spreading
function. See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not
Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 297, 304 ("Through loss spreading, compensation can, however, some-
what reduce the amount of disutility in society arising from the risks of loss created by issuer
misstatements."); Langevoort, supra note 1, at 649 ("Loss spreading, of course, is what insurance is
all about; there is nothing about self-funding that is necessarily objectionable."). But given the skep-
ticism about the effectiveness of shareholder compensation, it is the most recent to extensively
defend loss spreading as the rationale for shareholder compensation.
67. See GuiDo CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACODENTs 39 (1970) ("The justification found
most often among legal writers today for allocation of accident losses on a nonfault basis is that
accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly among people and over time.").
68. The commentators who have noted the loss-spreading function of shareholder compensa-
tion are skeptical about whether it is cost effective. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 1, at 730-34;
Langevoort, supra note 1, at 649.
69. See, e.g., Arlen & Camey, supra note 1, at 719 ("Victims of Fraud on the Market are
usually fully diversified investors, as are the shareholders who ultimately bear the costs under a rule
of enterprise liability."); Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 1822 ("The basic lesson of modem
portfolio theory is that shareholders can eliminate idiosyncratic risk-that is, firm-specific losses not
simultaneously experienced by other firms in the market-by holding a diversified portfolio of
equity securities."); Booth, supra note 7, at 7 ("[M]ost investors are diversified and as a result are
effectively protected against simple securities fraud."). An investor might also spread out its pur-
chases of stock over time, the so-called dollar cost-averaging technique, so that it is less likely that
any one purchase will be affected by fraud. Indeed, it is possible that some shareholders will simul-
taneously own stock that falls within and outside of the class. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1558-59.
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fraud, such an investor might also sell stock inflated by fraud. The losses
from purchasing inflated stock might be offset by the gains from selling
inflated stock.
The possibility of diversification powerfully challenges the traditional
justification for securities-fraud actions, the protection of investors. In the-
ory, any investor who wants protection against fraud can obtain it at the low
cost of diversifying her portfolio. Investors who do not obtain such protec-
tion may do so because they choose to take higher risks for the prospect of
higher returns.
While a complete defense of the investor-protection rationale is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting a few of the limits of diversifica-
tion. The first is that some unsophisticated investors are not diversified
because they are unaware of the risks of holding a large percentage of their
portfolio in one stock.7' Some investors may be undiversified because much
of their compensation comes in the form of the stock of the company for
whom they work.72 Securities-fraud actions might be necessary to protect
investors who are unable to diversify.
Moreover, the effectiveness of diversification rests on the assumption
that fraud is relatively isolated. In a world where a substantial number of
companies commit fraud, investors may be willing to pay less for the stock
of any company because of the possibility of fraud.73 As a result, the whole
market may suffer a fraud discount and even diversified investors will suffer
from the costs of fraud. 74 Substantial compliance with Rule lOb-5 is likely a
prerequisite to the effectiveness of diversification as a loss-spreading tech-
nique.
Not all investors may benefit equally from diversification. If the gains
and losses from fraud were randomly distributed, an investor could expect
that gains and losses from fraud would even out. But the gains from fraud
are not randomly distributed. Insiders of a company are more likely to cap-
ture the gains from fraud because they know when the company's stock is
inflated. Sophisticated investors may be more likely to tap into such inside
70. Of course, there are other rationales for securities-fraud actions such as deterrence. See
Coffee, supra note 1, at 1548-56.
71. See Evans, supra note 7, at 234-35.
72. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless
and Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus
Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 634-35 (2007) (describing how Enron employ-
ees were encouraged to purchase company stock).
73. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The
Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
671, 702 (1995) ("If misrepresentations raise or lower prices on average, then uninformed traders
averse to risk will not trade, lest they buy inflated stocks or sell undervalued stocks.").
74. See generally KRISHNA G. PALEPU ET AL., BUSINESS ANALYSIS & VALUATION: USING
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 1-7 (2d ed. 2000) ("Not being able to undo accounting distortions com-
pletely, investors 'discount' a firm's reported accounting performance.").
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information that would allow them to capture the gains from fraud by sell-
ing at the right time. 75 Thus, unsophisticated investors may be somewhat
more likely to be on the losing side of fraud.76
b. The Need for Loss Spreading Through Shareholder Compensation
As described earlier, shareholder compensation spreads losses from
Class Shareholders to Non-Class Shareholders. The question is whether loss
spreading through shareholder compensation performs a function that is
distinct from what could be achieved through diversification.
Loss spreading through shareholder compensation is best justified as a
way of protecting markets rather than investors. Risk-averse investors can
protect themselves from fraud losses through diversification, but diversifica-
tion does not protect markets from the distortion of fraud. By necessity, at
least some investors in an efficient market must take substantial positions in
stocks. If all investors were to protect themselves by buying index funds, the
market would not function in identifying good and bad companies.
As others have argued, the benefit of shareholder compensation is that it
makes investors more confident in taking substantial positions in individual
stocks without discounting such purchases by the probability that the stock
price is fraudulent.77 By spreading the burden of a Fundamental Decline
among Non-Class Shareholders and Class Shareholders, shareholder com-
pensation reduces the impact of fraud by putting shareholders who
happened to purchase stock inflated by the fraud in the same position as
78those shareholders who happened to purchase stock not inflated by a fraud.
Investors will purchase stock in a company with more confidence if they
know that they share the risk of fraud with other investors.
Goshen and Parchomovsky argue that the essential role of securities
regulation is to facilitate trading by sophisticated "information traders" who
are not necessarily diversified.79 Such information traders take advantage of
economies of scale in investing resources to collect and evaluate relevant
75. Access to information might explain the results of the Thakor study, supra note 15,
which found that institutions tend to be net beneficiaries of fraud.
76. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note 73, at 696 ("[E]ven diversified (uninformed) trad-
ing is subject to the risk of fraud if the resulting mispricings are biased or correlated.").
77. See id.; Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regu-
lation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006); see also Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in
Private Securities Litigation, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 333, 345-48 (arguing that securities litigation is
needed despite the circularity problem to compensate nondiversified informed traders).
78. Of course, some shareholders may own stock purchased both in and out of the class
period. The economic benefit of shareholder compensation to those shareholders will depend on the
circumstances. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 1505.
79. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 77.
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information. ° Frequent trading based on research by sophisticated investors
makes markets more efficient.8' If all investors did nothing more than buy
every stock, the market would not function. 2
Such information traders cannot rely on diversification because they
take substantial positions in the stock of one company." Of course, such
information traders should be expected to spend resources verifying whether
the company's disclosures are true. But not all fraud can be discovered by
outsiders, and if verification costs become too high, there will be a reduction
in liquidity.84 Shareholder compensation might increase liquidity by reduc-
ing the costs of verifying whether a company's disclosures are accurate.8" An
information trader would know that he would be compensated to some ex-S86
tent if the information he is relying on is inaccurate. Thus, he will need to
spend less to verify those disclosures."
An objection might be that compensating information traders, who are
more likely to fall within the Class because they trade frequently," may
come at the expense of unsophisticated investors, who tend to buy and hold
stock and may likely be Non-Class Shareholders. 9 But unsophisticated
80. Id. at 723-24.
81. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 802 (1985) ("Expenditures on security research by
institutional investors will play a major role in any mechanism that leads to efficient markets.").
82. See, e.g., id. at 789 ("If [the sophisticated trader] fails to acquire any costly information,
however, the market might fail to be efficient.").
83. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note 73, at 676 ("Market efficiency depends on in-
formed trading that cannot be diversified.").
84. See, e.g., id. at 698 ("Informed traders must be compensated for losses they incur due to
misrepresentations, or they will not service the market and correct prices.").
85. See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 77, at 737, 741.
86. Of course, it is unlikely that the shareholder compensation payment will cover all of the
losses from fraud. Evans, supra note 7, at 237-38 (noting that recoveries represent roughly 2-3
percent of losses).
87. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1984) ("A rule against fraud can reduce these
[verification] costs, especially for new firms'"). One might also argue that mitigating the risk of
fraud might not be a good thing because it reduces the incentives of sophisticated investors to seek
out fraud. But there is still an incentive because of the risk that an investor will not be totally com-
pensated for its loss. Moreover, there is still such an incentive for short sellers. Short sellers can
benefit disproportionately if they discover fraud and so have an incentive to invest in detecting
fraud. It might be better to leave fraud detection to specialists who can develop an expertise in fraud
detection.
88. Admittedly, encouraging frequent trading might increase speculation and volatility. But
speculation may be an important mechanism by which stocks adjust to their fundamental value.
Such speculation might be limited by compensating Class Shareholders for only Fundamental De-
clines. By limiting compensation to declines that reflect misinformation affecting valuation models,
shareholder compensation would be less likely to subsidize speculative trading.
89. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 1, at 733 ("In publicly held companies this would mean
that a small group of passive investors would partially compensate a large group of similarly
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investors often piggyback off the efforts of information traders who create a
liquid, efficient market where all investors can buy and sell shares easily.9°
Unsophisticated investors typically spend much less in verifying informa-
tion than information traders. Thus, it might be appropriate to require
unsophisticated investors to contribute to losses suffered by information
investors who purchase stock inflated by fraud.
c. Insurance as Facilitator of Loss Spreading
In its loss-spreading role, shareholder compensation is in a sense a form
of mandatory insurance for investors.9 The securities laws essentially
require public corporations to insure shareholders against the risk of pur-
chasing a stock that is inflated by fraud.92 Non-Class Shareholders bear
much of the burden of this insurance scheme though they often have nothing
to do with the fraud.93
Some of the costs of shareholder compensation, however, are mitigated
by the reality that most shareholder-compensation payments are made under
14insurance policies. In a sense, companies reinsure the risk of fraud by pur-chasing policies that cover the costs of securities-fraud actions.9 Since
situated investors, when in fact, both groups are without fault."); Coffee, supra note 1, at 1559-60;
Langevoort, supra note 72, at 634.
90. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note 73, at 698 ("The uninformed, through long-term
investment, share in the economic growth that propels the stock market. But this participation is
only possible because of the intervention of informed traders whose profits effectively come out of
the pockets of the uninformed.").
91. E.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 728 (5th
ed. 2006) ("To the extent that shareholders of the issuer fund most or all of the settlements and
judgments in fraud on the market-type cases, investors as a group are essentially creating a very
expensive-and perhaps inefficient-scheme of self-insurance."). The idea that securities-fraud
actions should serve as an insurance mechanism is controversial. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347-48 (2005) ("Such a rule [allowing for recovery without economic loss]
would tend to transform a private securities action into a partial downside insurance policy."); Don-
ald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 181 (2002) ("[Tlhere is very little reason to use the
class action device as what is essentially an insurance system against market mood swings.").
92. In a similar vein, a number of commentators have noted that liability under the Securities
Act of 1933 for misrepresentations associated with the issuance of securities creates a mandatory
"put" option, where an investor is essentially insured against declines in the stock price. See, e.g.,
Alexander, supra note 3, at 1447, 1452; James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Re-
sponse, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1190 (2007). The analogy is not a perfect fit because a "put" is
exercisable at will, but securities-fraud liability is conditioned on the existence of material misrepre-
sentations that cause investor losses.
93. The burden would vary depending on the ratio of Class to Non-Class Shareholders. See,
e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 1, at 719.
94. As noted earlier in Section II.B.1, this fact should lessen any 1Ob-5 Decline.
95. These policies are a variant of directors' and officers' ("D&O") insurance policies and
are referred to as Side C coverage. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 1166-68. In addition, there are
policies (Side B coverage) that cover the entity's costs of indemnifying individual directors and
officers. See id.
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1996, these entity-level policies have increased to the point where virtually
96
all publicly traded companies have such insurance. This is a development
that came after the earliest forms of the circularity problem were advanced.
Because the validity of the circularity problem is now accepted almost with-
out question, commentators have not extensively assessed how this new
insurance regime affects the validity of the circularity problem.97
While in a world without insurance, the substantial costs of shareholder
compensation are mostly borne by Damaged Shareholders, in a world with
insurance those costs are distributed among a wider range of parties.98 First,
anyone who is a shareholder while the corporation pays insurance premiums
contributes to the cost. This group would include Benefiting Shareholders,
shareholders who sold years before the fraud took place, as well as investors
who become shareholders after the fraud took place. Second, shareholders
of other insured companies bear some of the costs.99 Third, some of the costs
come out of the returns from investment of premiums by insurance
96. As Coffee explains:
To end these uncertainties, insurers began to write "corporate entity coverage," which directly
reimbursed the corporation for its own litigation expenses, its own settlement payments in se-
curities cases, and certain other forms of litigation. This form of insurance appears to have first
been offered in 1996, and thus is a relatively new development. Despite its recent appearance,
entity insurance caught on quickly, and over 90% of D&O insureds reported having entity
coverage as of 2002.
Coffee, supra note 1, at 1570 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing
Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV.
413, 443 (2004) ("The entity-insurance variation of D&O insurance first appeared in 1996, during
the growth period for this coverage.").
97. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 7, at 8 (assuming that "the company pays the damages");
Langevoort, supra note 1, at 648-49 (assuming that issuer pays costs).
98. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 66, at 305 (noting that any insurance-funded settlements facili-
tate loss spreading); cf Griffith, supra note 12, at 1163 (noting that D&O insurance spreads risk of
loss from directors and officers to the company).
99. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1, at 514 ("[I]nsurance serves a useful purpose of spreading the
loss over a wider range of individuals than those who were the immediate victims of the managers'
misbehavior. Such a result seems entirely consistent with the view that the securities class action is
compensatory."); John J. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): In Defense of
the Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 796-97 (1982) ("[T]here is a general sense of fair-
ness in expecting all investors, who rely on an honest market, to bear the increased cost of employer
insurance premiums, an increase caused by those employees and agents who render the market
dishonest."). Insurance companies diversify by insuring a wide range of risks. See, e.g., George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1542 (1987) ("Es-
sentially, an insurer is an agent for the diversification of risks.").
In addition to loss spreading, a number of commentators have focused on the benefits of moni-
toring that might come about under certain mandatory insurance schemes. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035 (2008) (proposing compliance insurance as an
alternative to corporate criminal liability); Cunningham, supra note 96 (proposing financial-
statement insurance). While insurance companies can monitor companies for securities fraud, Baker
and Griffith find that D&O insurers fail to monitor companies over the life of the insurance policy.
See Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 1808. Moreover, loss spreading may create a moral hazard
that decreases the incentive of the insured to avoid losses. See id. at 1817-21.
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companies. Thus, insurance amplifies and perhaps enables the loss-
spreading function of shareholder compensation.
Consider a simple example. Suppose there are ten companies, each of
which pays $1 in insurance premiums for entity-level coverage.'0° The insur-
ance company invests the $10, and over time that investment grows to $15.
Company A commits fraud and is liable for $10 in shareholder compensa-
tion (of which $2 goes to the plaintiffs' attorneys) and incurs $2 in defense
costs for a total cost of $12. Without insurance, Company A and its share-
holders would bear all of the cost of that $12 payment. With insurance,
Company A and its shareholders bear the cost of only the $1 premium.' ° '
The remaining $11 comes from the premiums paid by the other companies
and the return on investments by the insurance company, leaving a profit of
$3 for the insurance company.
While this is an idealized example, it is plausible that this fundamental
dynamic is currently at work. A market for entity-level insurance will only
exist if insurance companies find it profitable to provide such insurance.
0 2
Despite the significant costs of shareholder compensation, insurance com-
panies are willing to write policies covering such costs, indicating that the
costs are not unbearable.' °3 While certainly the expense of strike suits and
excessive attorney fees are still extremely problematic, the existence of a
functioning insurance market may indicate that gradual rather than radical
reform of shareholder compensation is appropriate.
A system that relies on corporations to purchase insurance is more effec-
tive than a system that simply relies on shareholders to diversify. Public
corporations are generally much more sophisticated than individual retail
investors in weighing the costs and benefits of investing in loss-spreading
mechanisms. While the cost of diversification for any one investor is low,
the cost of educating a substantial percentage of retail investors about ap-
propriate investment strategies would be extremely high. Because it is more
likely that an issuer will respond rationally to proper incentives at a lower
cost, issuers are likely the "least cost avoider" relative to retail investors, and
100. Assume for the sake of simplicity the premium is charged all in one year rather than
every year.
101. To simplify the example, assume there is no deductible.
102. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1, at 513 ("Insurance companies and casinos are both in the
odds business-they earn their profits probabilistically.").
103. See, e.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 1822 ("Loading fees mean that the cost of
buying insurance always exceeds the actuarial probability of loss (otherwise the insurer would be
driven out of business)."). Of course, there have been times when insurers do not find it profitable to
provide coverage for certain risks. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the After-
math of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158 (1990) (describing crisis in D&O insurance
market from 1984 to 1987).
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so the costs of securities fraud should be assigned to those issuers, who can
then contract to spread those losses. '°4
Insurance reduces the circularity of shareholder compensation. When a
corporation has no insurance, Class Shareholders fund a greater part of their
own settlement than when a corporation has insurance. With insurance, a
substantial part of shareholder compensation is funded by the premiums
paid in the past and future by shareholders of the defendant corporation as
well as any return on premiums invested by the insurance company.
Insurance also solves one of the most powerful objections against share-
holder compensation, that Benefiting Shareholders who sell stock at inflated
prices before the fraud is revealed contribute nothing to shareholder com-
pensation. In fact, Benefiting Shareholders contribute to the costs of
shareholder compensation in a world with insurance. They do so because
they contribute to the premiums while they are shareholders of the company.
Insurance can spread the costs of shareholder compensation to Benefiting
Shareholders before such shareholders are even identified.15
In a world that did not require shareholder compensation, no such insur-
ance system would arise. Without the rights and duties created by Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, Class Shareholders
would simply bear all of the costs of fraud. As a result, as argued above,
investors would be more cautious, holding diversified portfolios rather than
buying stocks of companies that they believe have significant potential. The
market might become less efficient in pricing individual stocks. Stocks gen-
erally might suffer a fraud discount that would depress overall prices,
especially in times where there is frequent fraud. Securities-fraud actions
have played an important role in spurring the creation of a wider system of
loss spreading.
One risk of this loss-spreading system is that it may do its job too well.
If companies bear only a small cost of the fraud, they will have few incen-
tives to prevent fraud. While insurance companies could theoretically
monitor those companies for fraud, one study found that such monitoring
generally does not occur. 6 But there are significant costs of securities fraud
that cannot be shifted to insurance companies. For example, the Credibility
Decline may not be remedied by an insurance payment if the market sus-
pects that a company has a tendency to commit fraud. The potential cost of a
credibility discount to a particular company's stock may help ensure that
loss spreading does not entirely eliminate the incentive to prevent fraud.
104. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 67, at 133-97 (discussing allocation of costs to
least cost avoider).
105. Of course, it is likely that the benefits the Benefiting Shareholder captures from the fraud
will be greater than the cost of contributing to insurance coverage.
106. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 1808.
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Given that it does not result in greater monitoring, entity-level insurance
is seen by some as the result of agency costs. If shareholders can protect
themselves by diversifying,' °7 and managers themselves control the risk of
fraud,"" managers might be motivated to purchase such insurance to protect
themselves and their bonuses against fluctuations in earnings. As one
prominent study contends, "Corporations buy entity-level coverage under
Side B and Side C of the D&O policy because they are run by selfish man-
agers who are willing to invest corporate assets in negative net present value
projects in order to protect their own compensation packages."' 9
While the personal interests of managers may be a factor, a more com-
pelling reason for purchasing entity-level insurance is to mitigate the burden
on Damaged Shareholders in footing the bill for shareholder compensation.
Furthermore, entity-level insurance also helps ensure that Benefiting Share-
holders contribute some amount to compensate Class Shareholders for their
loss. Thus, entity-level insurance policies may not only be the result of
agency costs, but a rational way of spreading the losses caused by securities
fraud.
C. A Point About Attorney Fees
Even if it serves a loss-spreading role, the existence of substantial trans-
action costs is a strong argument against the efficiency of securities-fraud
actions. As one text asks, "[a]s an investor ex ante, would you opt for a sys-
tem that provided compensation for open market fraud out of corporate
funds where some 20-30 percent of any recovery went to the plaintiffs' at-
torneys ... ?""o While shareholder compensation could be more efficient, it
might be useful to examine whether it is any more inefficient than a divi-
dend. As noted earlier, a similarity between dividends and shareholder
compensation is that the payment of either triggers substantial transaction
costs-taxes and attorney fees. In both cases, shareholders might retain
more wealth by simply allowing the company to keep the cash without in-
curring such substantial fees.
One might argue that a tax is less harmful to societal interests than
substantial attorney fees. Taxes are used for the benefit of the public while
attorney fees unduly enrich a few parties-attorneys for the plaintiffs and
defendants. But tax revenue can be used for wasteful projects that benefit
107. See sources cited supra note 69.
108. See Griffith, supra note 12, at 1171 ("[Entity-level coverage for the risk of shareholder
litigation is particularly puzzling since the corporation controls the governance processes that create
litigation risk.").
109. Id. at 1173; see also Baker & Griffith, supra note 16, at 1832-33.
110. COX ET AL., supra note 91, at 728; see also Langevoort, supra note 72, at 634-35.
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only a small segment of the population."' Attorney fees might be reinvested
in meritorious suits that target significant fraud. While some of the
transaction costs of taxes and attorney fees might be a deadweight loss, not
all of it is.''
2
Another difference is that attorney fees increase the incentive to bring
additional securities-fraud actions, while taxes provide an incentive in the
opposite direction with respect to payment of dividends. As a result, attor-
ney fees may result in overproduction of securities-fraud actions while taxes
may result in underproduction of dividends. But attorneys must also balance
the prospect of fees against the risk of dismissal and the cost of bringing a
case. If it appears that securities-fraud actions are overproduced, it might
make sense to increase the relative costs of bringing a suit or to reduce the
incentive to sue.
In any event, at least to the shareholder, the end effect is the same. With
both dividends and shareholder compensation, there is a significant cut that
is taken out of the cash payment. Thus, from an efficiency standpoint, both
dividends and shareholder compensation are somewhat similar. The point of
the comparison is not to imply that substantial attorney fees awards are not
problematic from the point of the shareholder. The point is that attorney fees
are no more problematic than the well-established dividend tax. Congress
has acted to manage the costs of the dividend tax by reducing it."' Similarly,
the solution to the inefficiency of shareholder compensation may be to find
some way to reduce the amount of the "tax" that shareholders pay to attor-
neys rather than doing away with securities-fraud actions. 14
D. Summary
In conclusion, like dividends, shareholder compensation poses two puz-
zles. Why would rational shareholders who are injured want a payment from
the company that comes partly from themselves? Why do shareholders need
shareholder compensation when if they are diversified, they are just as likely
to be winners as losers from securities fraud? Thinking of shareholder
I lI. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Inter-
pretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 542-48 (2009) (describing how special-interest groups take
advantage of earmark rules).
112. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 34, at 246 n.8 ("It is worth noting that, as with all transac-
tion costs, these are only waste if the recipients (in this case, plaintiffs' lawyers), put the money to
less good use than do the corporation and insurance companies paying damages.").
113. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
114. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLuM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986) ("[T]he basic goal of reform should be to reduce the agency costs
incident to this attomey-client relationship.").
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compensation as a dividend suggests responses to these two forms of the
circularity problem.
First, shareholder compensation is not a meaningless transfer from
shareholders to themselves. Class Shareholders capture most of the benefits
from shareholder compensation, which is largely funded by Non-Class
Shareholders. This transfer is less circular than a dividend and justified be-
cause Class Shareholders suffered from the Fundamental Decline.
Second, shareholder compensation serves a distinct loss-spreading func-
tion. While diversification protects individual investors, it does not protect
markets. Shareholder compensation creates a system where the costs of
fraud are spread rather than falling solely on Class Shareholders. Insurance
facilitates this system and ensures that even Benefiting Shareholders bear
some of the costs of fraud. Corporations are better able to assess the costs
and benefits of investing in loss-spreading measures than most individual
investors.
Of course, it is difficult to quantify these benefits against the costs of
shareholder compensation. And shareholder compensation may be more
beneficial in some contexts than others. But this analysis shows that circu-
larity in itself is not a reason to reject shareholder compensation. Far from
being structurally flawed, shareholder compensation serves an important
role in managing the costs of securities fraud.
III. THE SHAREHOLDER COMPENSATION PUZZLE
Thinking of shareholder compensation as a dividend suggests that some
of the arguments explaining the payment of dividends might provide addi-
tional justification for the payment of shareholder compensation. A
substantial body of finance literature has proposed three solutions for the
dividend puzzle: (1) dividends are a way by which management can signal
inside information to investors; (2) dividends lower agency costs by reduc-
ing free cash flow; and (3) dividends allow shareholders to diversify.
This Part describes each of the three explanations for dividends and then
analyzes whether the explanation might be applicable to shareholder com-
pensation. The signaling explanation in particular is not strong with respect
to shareholder compensation because managers have an incentive to distort
any signal. Any diversification effect of dividends is likely to be modest.
However, the agency costs rationale may be relevant to the issue of share-
holder compensation.
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A. Signaling
1. Dividends
A corporation might pay a dividend to signal that it has strong future
prospects. While public corporations are required to make disclosures and
file audited financial statements, such filings tend to summarize past per-
formance while only hinting at the future. By paying a dividend,
management can convey that it expects that earnings or cash flow will in-
crease over time, perhaps justifying a higher valuation for the stock. As
Merton H. Miller and Kevin Rock explain the signaling theory, "In a world
of rational expectations, the firm's dividend (or financing) announcements
provide just enough pieces of the firm's sources and uses statement for the
market to deduce the unobserved piece, to wit, the firm's current earn-
ings."' 15
Such a signal might be necessary because financial statements and other
disclosures can be manipulated." 6 Shareholders may be skeptical that pub-
licly available information truly reflects the ability of the company to
generate cash flow. By paying a dividend, the management is putting its
money (or perhaps more accurately the company's money) where its mouth
is. Management is signaling through the dividend payment that it is confi-
dent that it can generate cash flow and that there is substance behind its
projections for future earnings.
In contrast, cutting a dividend may be a signal that the company is in
dire financial straits. The decision to reduce or eliminate a dividend may
come about because the board or management is not confident that the com-
pany can generate enough cash to fund a dividend. The company may be
suffering from declining cash flows and unable to raise money from the debt
or equity markets without agreeing to reduce its dividend.
115. Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information, 40 J.
FIN. 1031, 1031 (1985); see also Bratton, supra note 36, at 862-63 (describing signaling theory);
Martin Feldstein & Jerry Green, Why Do Companies Pay Dividends?, 73 Am. EcON. REv. 17, 18
(1983) ("[D]ividends are a signal of the sustainable income of the corporation: management selects
a dividend policy to communicate the level and growth of real income because conventional ac-
counting reports are inadequate guides to current income and future prospects "); Fischel, supra note
39, at 709 ("[B]oth theory and empirical evidence seem to indicate that, although dividend policy
has no independent impact on the value of the firm's shares, changes in dividend payout frequently
convey new information about the prospects of the firm.").
116. This was especially so in the early part of the twentieth century when there was weak
financial disclosure. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends?
Evidence From History, 56 TAx L. REv. 463, 471 (2003) ("Given the weakness of [early twentieth-
century] financial disclosure, a liberal dividend policy served an important signaling function for
current and potential stockholders.").
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A criticism of the signaling theory is that the payment of a dividend is at
best a weak signal."' Many companies pay dividends,"' and so investors
cannot learn much about a company solely from the decision to pay a divi-
dend. Because dividends typically involve relatively small sums, they may
be perceived as "cheap talk."" 9 Dividend decisions can be ambiguous and
motivated by varying reasons. 10 Management, knowing that dividends send
a signal of financial health, may try to game the system by sending a false
signal to buy time to turn the company around or to enrich themselves by
selling stock before an imminent decline. The evidence is consistent with
these criticisms in that the decision to pay a dividend is associated with only
a small positive return.121
Cutting a dividend, however, might send a stronger signal to investors.
Studies show that investors tend to react more to the decision to reduce a
dividend than a decision to pay a dividend. 2 Given that dividend cuts are
relatively rare, 2 the decision by management to reduce a dividend sends a
clear signal that something is wrong. It may be less likely that management
would have a motive to fool the market into believing the prospects of the
company are poor, so the signal is more credible.
Moreover, even if dividends do communicate information to investors,
there is a question as to whether a dividend is the best way to send such a
signal.124 There are other ways that management might credibly signal belief
117. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 36, at 865-66 (summarizing finance literature establishing
that dividend signal is weak); Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 651; Miller & Rock, supra note 115, at
1046 ("But in a world with rational expectations, dividends, for all their pleasant connotations,
cannot turn a loser into a winner.").
118. See supra note 47.
119. See Bratton, supra note 36, at 865.
120. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 39, at 109-11 (describing different messages that could be
conveyed by dividend decisions). Victor Brudney thus proposes that management be required to
make disclosures about the basis for certain types of dividend decisions. See Brudney, supra note
39; see also William W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility, and Corporate Law, 19 CARDOzo L.
REV. 409 (1997) (discussing Brudney's disclosure proposal in light of incomplete-contracts model).
But see Fischel, supra note 39 (criticizing Brudney's proposal).
121. See Joseph Aharony & Itzhak Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements
and Stockholders' Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. FIN. 1 (1980) (finding empirical link be-
tween dividends and earnings); David J. Denis et al., The Information Content of Dividend Changes:
Cash Flow Signaling, Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYsiS 567 (1994). But see Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Earnings Information Conveyed
by Dividend Initiations and Omissions, 21 J. FIN. EcoN. 149 (1988) (finding abnormal 4 percent rise
in stock price following dividend announcements by companies paying dividends for first time).
122. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 36, at 868 (reporting that dividend cuts on average cause 6
percent drop in stock price); Miller & Rock, supra note 115, at 1046 ("[T]he best place for empirical
researchers to look for evidence of dividend signalling may well be among firms falling into adver-
sity, not because they then start signalling, but because they stop.").
123. Though, in times of economic turmoil, many corporations reduce their dividends.
124. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 36, at 866 ("The corporate governance system holds out
plenty of ways to signal confidence about future performance.").
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in the strength of a company's prospects.' 25 Publicly disclosed earnings pro-
jections are a standard by which management can manage the market's
expectations of earnings. Management stock purchases might be a more
credible signal than a dividend because management is risking its own
money. Similarly, when management sells stock, it may be a signal that the
prospects of a company are poor. Finally, any signaling theory must deal
with the possibility that managers simply are not good at predicting earn-
ings, further weakening the utility of any signaling.
26
2. Shareholder Compensation
Like a dividend, the payment of shareholder compensation can send a
signal, though the signal differs from the signal sent by a dividend. Rather
than signaling the strength of a company, payment of shareholder compen-
sation signals a weakness-the company's managers may have committedf 127
fraud. As a result, managers, who influence whether shareholder compen-
sation is paid, have incentives to weaken any signal by settling the case after
years of stonewalling litigation. Any signal is weakened further because the
decision to pay shareholder compensation is involuntary and the payment is
covered by an insurance company.
A large shareholder-compensation payment may signal that a securities-
fraud action had merit. 12 As a result, shareholders may further question the
125. And the credibility of a dividend decision may be lessened if management does not make
additional commitments to signal their belief. See Harry DeAngelo et al., Reversal of Fortune: Divi-
dend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1996).
126. See id. at 364-65 ("[A]nother possibility is that ... managers suffer from a behavioral
bias-over-optimism-that leads them to overestimate future earnings when growth prospects
fade.").
127. At least in terms of signaling, shareholder compensation is more analogous to a decision
to cut a dividend than the decision to pay a dividend.
128. The size of the settlement might provide some signal as to the merit of the case, but the
signal is difficult to precisely interpret. Janet Cooper Alexander famously argued that settlements of
securities-fraud actions are unrelated to the merits, pointing to a small sample of settlements that fell
within a similar range. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 514-15 (1991). More recent studies have criticized
Alexander's methodology, and a study in 2008 establishes that settlements of securities-fraud ac-
tions vary significantly in size. See James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and ... There Are
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REv. 355, 384
(2008); see also Grundfest, supra note 7, at 743 (finding variance in settlement amounts, but also
finding that a significant number of suits were likely to have been without merit). A key metric,
according to Joseph Grundfest, is the difference between the settlement amount and the cost of
defending the lawsuit. See id. at 740-41. If the settlement amount is lower or equal to the defense
costs that would be incurred in defending the suit, it may signal that the parties believe that the case
is likely without merit. See id. at 741. To the extent that the settlement amount is greater than the
potential defense costs, the company may be signaling that it has identified an issue that must be
addressed through a substantial payment. See id. And indeed, there appears to be evidence that
directors and officers pay some reputational penalty for significant settlements, indicating that larger
settlements may send a signal. See Helland, supra note 24. Though settlements differ in size, it is
still difficult to conclude that settlements clearly signal the merit of a case. A large settlement might
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credibility of management. Any such signal, however, can be obscured by
settling the case rather than risking a trial. By couching any settlement as a
decision to avoid the risk and cost of a trial, management can imply that the
settlement is merely a cost of doing business rather than an indication that it
defrauded shareholders. The signal can be obscured even further through
delay. If years go by before any settlement, the market may not consider any
signal conveyed by such a settlement to be relevant.
Shareholder compensation is likely to be a weaker signal than payment
of a dividend because it is involuntary rather than voluntary. In most cases,
management initiates a dividend, perhaps prompted by optimism of future
cash flows. In contrast, shareholder compensation is a response to a lawsuit.
Management cannot simply choose to walk away from a securities-fraud
action without paying shareholder compensation. A settlement might have
nothing to do with a concern for compensating shareholders, and is likely a
decision made by management to avoid liability. "9
Any signal is weakened even further because as noted above, most
shareholder settlements are covered by insurance policies purchased by the
company to cover the costs of securities litigation. Usually, the insurance
company simply pays the settlement without any apportionment of blame
among individual managers who might be responsible for the fraud.3 The
signal may not strictly reflect the merits of the case but rather the influence
of a third party whose main interest is resolving the claim at an amount so
that the premiums it receives cover the costs of the settlement.'3'
The payment of shareholder compensation, however, does signal that
management and shareholder plaintiffs have reached a consensus about the• 132
value of a case given the circumstances. In defending a securities-fraud
action, companies with good governance will investigate the allegations
carefully and address any deficiencies that are found. To the extent that the
company is able to make rational assessments and respond appropriately, it
might be able to reduce any Credibility Decline. However, it is difficult for
only reflect that a lawsuit was associated with a large stock price decline and that the risk of not
settling the case was high rather than that management is truly culpable.
129. To the extent that directors or officers are named in the suit, a board may have an incen-
tive to settle the case to protect their peers. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1566-67.
130. See id. at 1569-70.
131. There is evidence that policy limits often influence the size of settlements. See Tom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors'and Officers'Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 755 (2009). On the other hand, while a large settlement might indi-
cate simply that the insurance company does not want to fight, or faces a significant amount of
exposure, it can also be read as a recognition that there is enough merit to the claim that a substan-
tial payment is necessary to resolve the case. Baker and Griffith found evidence that parties consider
the "sex appeal" of the case in assessing settlements. Id. at 787-88.
132. See Grundfest, supra note 7, at 739 ("At the core of any settlement calculation lie the
parties' assessments of the probability and magnitude of any potential verdict.").
[Vol. 108:323
Shareholder Compensation as Dividend
the market to evaluate which companies are assessing the merits of securi-
ties-fraud actions in good faith.
As with dividends, there may be more effective ways of signaling that a
company is responsive to fraud. Companies can address Credibility Declines
133by being more forthcoming in the future 3. Disciplining the offending man-
agers, assessing the merits of the suit objectively, fixing internal controls
that allowed the fraud, or delivering legitimate increases in earnings might
send a signal that the company takes allegations of fraud seriously. Share-




Payment of dividends might reduce agency costs by reducing the ability
of management to waste free cash flow. 3 4 As defined by one commentator,
"[f]ree cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects
that have positive net present values .... Management may have an in-
centive to retain shareholder funds to invest in projects that do not benefit
shareholders.1 6 Management may do so to engage in empire building, or
because they want to retain power over assets. Management may also be risk
averse, preferring to keep a healthy cash cushion for a rainy day. Sharehold-
ers might be better off if the cash was returned to them so they can reinvest
in more promising ventures. By lowering the amount of cash at manage-
ment's disposal, a dividend helps prevent managers from investing in
wasteful projects that do not benefit shareholders.1
7
Dividends might focus managers on running the company more effi-
ciently. Because a dividend reduces free cash flow, managers must do more
with less and make difficult decisions such as cutting costs. If managers
133. Studies differ on whether scandals result in significant manager turnover. Compare Anup
Agrawal et al., Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud,
42 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1999) (finding little evidence of higher management turnover in firms charged
with fraud), with Greg Niehaus & Greg Roth, Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in
Firms Subject to Securities Class Action, 28 FIN. MGMT. 52 (1999) (finding higher CEO turnover in
firms accused of fraud compared to other firms that experience large stock price drops).
134. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 36, at 866-67 (describing agency-cost explanation); Feld-
stein & Green, supra note 115, at 18 ("[Slhareholders distrust the management and fear that retained
earnings will be wasted in poor investments, higher management compensation, etc.").
135. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.
76 AM. EcoN. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
136. See, e.g., id. ("Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout
policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow.").
137. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 5, at 889 ("[Dividend] distributions themselves decrease
funds available for suboptimal managerial investment and perquisite consumption.").
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borrow money to finance a dividend, the resulting debt might also provide
discipline because managers will need to generate cash flow to make inter-
est payments. 38 Even if the relative amount of the dividend is small in
relation to the company's cash flows, paying a regular dividend may keep
management focused on maximizing shareholder wealth.
One commentator argues in a similar vein that dividends result in moni-
toring of management because investors will scrutinize a company anew
whenever it issues new debt or equity to finance a dividend. 39 An under-
writer will do due diligence, examining the financial statements,
competence of management, and general prospects of the company. While
this may be less of a factor with well-established public corporations that
can utilize shelf registrations, it might be an explanation with respect to
less-established companies that cannot. In addition, debt markets can pro-
vide an additional set of monitors who will assess the prospects of the
company on an ongoing basis.
There is some evidence that dividend payments are associated with
companies with good corporate governance. One study finds that companies
in legal regimes that focus on protecting investors are more likely to pay
higher dividends than companies in legal regimes with less investor protec-
tion. 1' This finding supports the thesis that dividends are a sign that a
company is being run efficiently for investors rather than for management.1
42
While dividends provide some checks on management, the effect may
be trivial. Management must deal with a myriad of issues that discipline
their use of shareholder cash. Most public companies issue debt regardless
of whether they pay dividends and are thus subject to the monitoring of the
138. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 5, at 896-97 (describing disciplining effect of debt); Jen-
sen, supra note 135, at 324 ("[D]ebt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash
flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.").
139. Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 654 ("The principal value of keeping firms constantly in
the market for capital is that the contributors of capital are very good monitors of managers."); see
also Bratton, supra note 36, at 869-70.
140. See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, 17 C.ER. § 230.415 (2008).
141. The study's authors summarize its findings as follows:
Empirically, we find that dividend policies vary across legal regimes in ways consistent with a
particular version of the agency theory of dividends. Specifically, firms in common law coun-
tries, where investor protection is typically better, make higher dividend payouts than firms in
civil law countries do. Moreover, in common but not civil law countries, high growth firms
make lower dividend payouts than low growth firms. These results support the version of the
agency theory in which investors in good legal protection countries use their legal powers to
extract dividends from firms, especially when reinvestment opportunities are poor.
Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, 55 J. FiN. 1, 2
(2000).
142. One study finds that the market reacts more favorably to dividend announcements for
firms that may be overinvesting than for firms that may not be overinvesting. Larry H.P. Lang &
Robert H. Litzenberger, Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hy-
pothesis?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 181 (1989).
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capital markets. And too much debt can be a detriment to a company, requir-
ing managers to spend time generating cash flow in the short run to finance
its debt rather than investing in long-term projects. Moreover, there are
many other mechanisms that can be used to discipline management-
derivative suits, shareholder votes, and takeovers. 43 Finally, because divi-
dends are relatively common, and not all dividend-paying companies have
efficient and disciplined managers, one can question whether dividends have
a significant impact on reducing agency costs. '44
2. Shareholder Compensation
Like a dividend, shareholder compensation may help reduce agency
costs. '45 This is a more compelling rationale for shareholder compensation
than signaling. If the company is not covered by insurance, shareholder
compensation must come from free cash flow or the company must issue
additional debt or equity to finance a shareholder compensation payment. A
company issuing securities to pay shareholder compensation may subject
itself to additional scrutiny by the capital markets. As a result, management
might feel more pressure to use resources effectively, reducing the tempta-
tion to waste cash for projects that are not in the best interest of
shareholders. Because of the pressure of operating the company with less
cash, fraud-committing management will have to prove itself or face termi-
nation.
46
The agency-costs explanation questions a basic assumption of the circu-
larity problem, that requiring a company to distribute cash to shareholders
143. See Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 651 ("The problem here is that it is unclear just what
dividends signal, how they do so, or why dividends are better signals than apparently cheaper meth-
ods."). But see Goshen, supra note 5, at 894 (arguing that dividends are a cheaper and less drastic
way of disciplining management than takeovers).
144. One barrier to the use of dividends to discipline managers is that managers might influ-
ence the board to pay a suboptimal level of dividends. One way to address this concern advanced by
Zohar Goshen is to give shareholders more power in deciding whether earnings are retained by the
company or paid out in dividends. See Goshen, supra note 5. Companies could be required to adopt
shareholder dividend options, where a shareholder could periodically choose to exercise the option
for a cash or stock dividend. If shareholders believe that management is likely to use free cash flow
wisely, they will not exercise the shareholder dividend option. If shareholders believe that manage-
ment will waste free cash flow, they will choose to exercise the shareholder dividend option. As a
result, the capital markets rather than management would decide the allocation of earnings.
145. Of course, the potential for reducing agency costs is not unique to shareholder compen-
sation. The same effect could be achieved by imposing monetary penalties. But penalties are less
feasible a remedy in the absence of evidence of malicious intent. See Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2006-4.htm.
146. While the agency-costs rationale may sound like a variant of the deterrence rationale, the
two concepts are not entirely the same. Deterrence seeks to prevent actors from bad acts by making
them directly bear the costs of their bad acts. Shareholder compensation does not impose direct
costs on managers, but instead takes away resources that might be used for acts that are not in the
best interest of shareholders.
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will necessarily reduce the value of the firm to an extent that offsets any
benefit to shareholders who receive compensation. In some circumstances,
paying out free cash flow may have ancillary benefits that add to rather than
offset the benefit received by Class Shareholders. Such benefits are captured
not only by Class Shareholders, but to the extent that agency costs overall
are reduced, Non-Class Shareholders may benefit as well.1
47
And obviously, companies where managers commit fraud are especially
prone to agency-cost problems. Managers commit fraud to create the per-
ception that they are doing a good job and to enrich themselves by
exercising stock options at an inflated value.44 They might also commit
fraud to save their jobs when a company is on the brink of insolvency.4 The
problem of managers who act in their own interests is not just a theoretical
possibility with such companies, but a reality that must be addressed. Man-
agers who commit fraud should be entrusted with fewer resources and work
under constraints until they regain the trust of shareholders.
Of course, if insurance covers the shareholder compensation payment,
the effect of shareholder compensation on agency costs may be reduced.
With insurance, management can settle a case knowing it will not signifi-
cantly reduce free cash flow. 15 But even insurance requires payment of a
significant deductible, and companies that commit securities fraud are likely
to pay higher insurance premiums in the future, reducing free cash flow.''5' A
company that has committed securities fraud will likely pay more when ob-
taining a new policy because insurance companies consider corporate
governance in setting the premium. 1
2
In addition, the payment of insurance premiums may be similar to debt
in that it reduces free cash flow available to management over time. Thus,
even companies that do not suffer from securities fraud will see some reduc-
tion in free cash flow. As with dividends, it is likely that the impact of
insurance premiums on agency costs will be modest, especially for large
companies.
147. This effect would be in addition to any reduction in agency costs resulting generally from
a mandatory-disclosure regime. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995) (arguing that disclosure statutes help reduce
agency costs).
148. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1562-63.
149. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 1, at 694, 702-03.
150. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 131, at 796-98.
151. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE
PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM 17 (2008), available at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get ilr doc.phpdocld=1213 ("Even when a company's insurance
covers the settlement and litigation costs, the company ultimately ends up footing much of the bill
because insurance premiums inevitably increase to reflect the higher risk of liability.").
152. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors' & Officers 'Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007).
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It is unlikely that the agency-costs effect of shareholder compensation
would be the same for all companies. Small companies may find it more
difficult to operate with less cash than large companies. Growing companies
with many projects for profitable investment may suffer greater opportunity
costs from reduced free cash flow than mature companies with fewer poten-
tial investments. Thus, shareholder compensation may be more effective in
reducing agency costs with respect to large, mature companies than with
respect to small, growing companies.
C. Diversification
1. Dividends
Shareholders might want a dividend to have the option of further diversi-
fying their investments. A shareholder can consume the dividend,'53 use it
for other investments, or even use it to purchase more stock of the company
paying the dividend. A shareholder might prefer to have a dollar in hand
than the prospect of a future return.1
4
There is some evidence that companies pay dividends because there are
dividend constituencies, or investors with a special preference for compa-
nies that pay dividends."' For example, retired individuals may be more
interested in investing in established companies paying regular dividends
that can be used as income than younger individuals who look for compa-
nies that do not pay dividends but have high growth prospects.'5 6 When
dividends are taxed as income, shareholders in lower tax brackets may be
more inclined to hold shares in companies that pay higher dividends than
153. See, e.g., Feldstein & Green, supra note 115, at 17 ("[T]here is the desire on the part of
small investors, fiduciaries, and nonprofit organizations for a steady stream of dividends with which
to finance consumption."); Fischel, supra note 39, at 703 ("A dividend payment does not affect risk;
rather, it reduces the proportion of the investor's assets in equities.").
154. E.g., Brudney, supra note 39, at 88 ("[D]ividend distributions on share prices rest on the
assumption that stockholders rationally tend to value a dividend in hand more highly than they do
the capitalized value of the earnings expected from management's reinvestment of the amount thus
paid out'"); id. at 95 ("[T]here is evidence to suggest a systematic stockholder preference for indi-
vidual investor power to make the reinvestment decision, and there are grounds to explain such a
systematic preference.").
155. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 456.
156. Prior to the reduction of the dividend tax, dividends were more attractive for retired
individuals who are more likely to pay lower marginal tax rates.
One explanation for the dividend puzzle is that mutual funds do not pay attention to the tax
consequences of their investment decisions. Thus, they may not sufficiently influence companies to
reduce dividend payments. See Mitchell L. Engler, A Missing Piece to the Dividend Puzzle: Agency
Costs of Mutual Funds, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 215 (2003).
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shareholders in higher tax brackets, and some investors may be able to avoid
the dividend tax entirely. 1
57
The diversification rationale can be illustrated by the classic case Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co.5' In that case, the Dodge Brothers, who were both share-
holders and competitors of the Ford Motor Company ("Ford Motor"), sued
for an injunction requiring Ford Motor to pay out a special dividend rather
than invest those funds for capital improvements. The Dodge brothers agi-
tated for a dividend payment by Ford Motor, presumably because they
wanted the cash so they could invest in their own automobile business. 59
Putting aside the possible nefarious motive of undermining a competitor,
this is an example where a dividend was desired for diversification. The
Dodge brothers might have believed that they would have earned higher
returns by investing the cash in their own business or some other stock than
allowing Ford Motor to invest the money.
In modem times, the diversification explanation may not be so compel-
ling because most shareholders tend to reinvest the dividend in purchasing
the same stock.' 60 Moreover, any diversification effect would be small, at
best, especially for institutional investors. A dividend is typically equivalent
to a small percentage of the value of the stock, which in turn may be only
one of many stocks held by the investor.
Diversification may be a more compelling rationale for dividend pay-
ments for closely held corporations than public corporations. In a closely
held corporation, a few shareholders own the company. 6 Because they may
have a significant portion of their assets invested in the company, sharehold-
ers in closely held corporations are more likely to rely on dividend income
as a primary source of income than the typical investor in a public corpora-
tion. Unlike public corporations, there is no active market where shares in
closely held corporations can be traded. A shareholder of a closely held cor-
poration may want the cash from a dividend to consume because it knows it
will not sell its shares for a long time, if at all.1
62
It is possible that the payment of dividends by public corporations is a
continuation of the practice of paying dividends by closely held corpora-
tions. The decline in the number of companies that pay dividends over the
157. See Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Dividends and Taxes, 6 J. FIN. EcON. 333,
334-35 (1978).
158. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
159. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 301 (1999).
160. Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 651.
161. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TuI. L. REV.
1143, 1152-53 (1989) (discussing characteristics of close corporations).
162. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 116, at 472 ("For the 19th century investor, dividends fre-
quently comprised the only foreseeable source of return on a stockholder's investment.").
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163
last thirty years or so may be a reflection of the rise of highly transparent,
efficient, liquid, public markets where shares are easily bought and sold and
where investors can easily generate cash by realizing capital gains, perhaps
making dividends a relic of the past.
2. Shareholder Compensation
As with dividends, shareholder compensation provides a modest oppor-
tunity for diversification. Class Shareholders who receive shareholder
compensation can invest it in other securities, or keep the funds in cash.
Class Shareholders may prefer diversification after a fraud because of the
risk that management will commit fraud again.
But the diversification effect of shareholder compensation is trivial, es-
pecially for institutional investors.'6 As one commentator notes,
shareholder-compensation payments are often a small fraction of the assets• - • 65
managed by these institutions. Moreover, investors tend to recover only a
small fraction of alleged losses.166 But it does appear that at least some in-
vestors care about such small amounts, as evidenced by the suits brought
against institutions that failed to submit claims for shareholder compensa-
tion. 16 And while shareholders recover only a fraction of their losses, that
fact may be an argument for increasing rather than decreasing the potency of
securities-fraud actions.
Another problem with the diversification explanation might be that
shareholders who want to diversify after a fraud can do so more efficiently
by selling a portion of their shares. Indeed, Class Shareholders who sell
their shares are sending a strong signal that they would rather have cash than
hold on to the company's shares. But some shareholders may believe that
the fundamentals of the business are good, and might prefer to continue
holding their shares. Shareholder compensation might be a modest way of
allowing them to choose whether to reinvest in the company or diversify
further.
IV. MAKING SHAREHOLDER COMPENSATION MORE LIKE A DIVIDEND
Thinking of shareholder compensation as a dividend suggests some
novel ways of compensating shareholders for fraud. What if a company
163. See supra note 47.
164. However, losses may be more significant for retail investors. See, e.g., Evans, supra note
7, at 226.
165. See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002).
166. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 7, at 226.
167. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CaIPERS: Survey Evidence on the De-




could compensate shareholders for securities fraud through a dividend?161
Distribution of shareholder compensation as a dividend would address the
problem that many shareholders fail to submit claims for shareholder com-
pensation. One could also imagine a system that allowed companies to
resolve meritorious securities-fraud actions preemptively, by paying a divi-
dend that would cover part or all of the harm to shareholders.' 69 Such a
dividend might send a strong signal that the corporation takes securities
fraud seriously, perhaps remedying the Credibility Decline. Such a dividend
might reduce the transaction cost of plaintiffs' attorney fees if it counted
against the damages that would be recovered by a securities-fraud action.
This Part discusses the potential for paying shareholder compensation as a
dividend, either as a resolution to shareholder litigation or as a preemptive
response to such actions.
A. Distributing Shareholder Compensation Through a Dividend
A significant practical problem with shareholder compensation is that
many Class Shareholders do not collect it. In their influential study of insti-
tutional shareholders who are Class Shareholders, James Cox and Randall
Thomas found that only about 30 percent of such shareholders submitted
claims.170 While there is no empirical study of whether retail investors who
168. Private litigants can seek injunctive relief through a securities-fraud action. See, e.g.,
Simon De Bartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 170-71 (2d Cir.
1999). Rather than setting up a common fund, the parties could agree to injunctive relief requiring
the corporation to pay a dividend to cover shareholder damages from the fraud. While it does not
appear to be common, it is not unprecedented for a class-action settlement to be distributed as a
dividend to shareholders. See, e.g., Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., No. 5719, 1978 WL 2514, at
*2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 1978) (describing settlement plan to distribute stock as a dividend); see also
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (requiring payment of dividend by Ford).
The lack of a common fund should not prevent collection of reasonable attorney fees. While
fee awards have been premised on the creation of a common fund, see, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 2003 to
add FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h), which provides that "the court may award reasonable attorney's fees...
by the parties' agreement." This provision does not condition payment of attorney fees on the crea-
tion of a common fund.
169. This Article is not the first to note the possibility of a dividend as a mechanism for com-
pensating shareholders. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 15, at 947 ("Shareholders as a group would
be further ahead if the resources spent on the lawsuit were simply paid to them as a dividend, with-
out the lawsuit's transaction costs."). But this Article is the first in-depth treatment of the possibility.
170. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional I-
vestors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855 (2002) [hereinafter
Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table]; James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions
Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial
Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005) [here-
inafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions].
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are Class Shareholders submit claims, anecdotal evidence suggests it is
likely that the percentage making such claims is also low.
7
1
The reasons for the failure to submit claims vary. Many Class Share-
holders own a nominal amount of stock. If the Class Shareholder is
diversified, the particular stock may represent only a small percentage of the
investor's overall portfolio. Any share of the recovery may be for only a
small percentage of the loss incurred. It is not surprising that investors may
not take the trouble to fill out the paperwork to submit a claim for a rela-
tively insignificant amount. An investor might rationally rather spend the
time researching other investments that might result in a much larger payoff.
In addition, some investors may not submit claims because they do not ap-
prove of securities-fraud actions.
The failure of investors to submit claims is a powerful argument against
the effectiveness of securities-fraud actions as a compensatory device. If the
investors who are allegedly harmed by a misrepresentation do not bother to
claim funds, it is difficult to argue that securities-fraud actions play a sig-
nificant compensatory role. '  At the very least, it is troubling that the
aggregate compensation actually collected by investors may be in the same
ballpark as the fees collected by the attorneys.,
7 3
One way of addressing the problem of noncollection would be to dis-
tribute settlements or judgments in securities-fraud actions in part or in
whole as a "preferred" dividend to Class Shareholders. That way, Class
Shareholders who continue to hold their shares would not be required to
submit a claim to receive their recovery. Such a distribution would guaran-
tee that 100 percent of Class Shareholders (at least the ones who continue to
hold on to the stock and do not opt out of the class-action settlement) collect
some shareholder compensation. Doing so might also reduce some of the
transaction costs of administering a fund and processing the claims of Class
171. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 1501 ("Though reliable empirical information is
difficult to obtain, it appears that a significant number of class members-representing as many as
forty percent of the shares in the class-do not file claims."); Christopher R. Leslie, The Signifi-
cance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71,
119-20 (2007) ("When settlements require class members to file statements or proofs of claim in
order to receive their share of the common fund, 'response rates are often very small, and rarely
exceed 50%.').
172. See Pritchard, supra note 165, at 884 (concluding that Cox and Thomas's results under-
mine the compensation rationale for securities-fraud class actions).
173. On the other hand, after the publication of the Cox and Thomas study, about forty institu-
tional investors that failed to collect shareholder compensation were sued for breach of fiduciary
duty. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 167, at 332.
174. Class Shareholders would be in a similar position as holders of preferred stock who are
entitled to payment of a dividend before common shareholders.
175. Notice of a settlement would be circulated prior to payment of the preferred dividend. A
Class Shareholder could still opt out of the settlement prior to payment of the preferred dividend.




Shareholders, increasing the funds that are available to compensate share-
holders.1
6
But what of selling Class Shareholders, who are entitled to shareholder
compensation but are not currently holding the stock? A selling Class
Shareholder might be required to submit a claim for shareholder compensa-
tion, which would provide a modest incentive not to sell the stock. Or, any
right to a preferred dividend could be transferred to the shareholder who
purchased stock from the selling Class Shareholder. If the purchasing share-
holder expects to receive a preferred dividend, the Class Shareholder might
be able to sell the stock at a premium that reflects the value of any expected
preferred dividend.
As a practical matter, it might be difficult for companies to identify
Class Shareholders. 77 If that is the case, an alternative proposal would be to
go through the typical process of setting up a common fund and requiring
Class Shareholders to submit claims; then pay out any unclaimed settlement
funds through a dividend to all shareholders, whether they are in the Class
or not in the Class. Courts may have the power to distribute any unclaimed
funds in such a way under the cy pres doctrine, where such funds are put to
their "next best use."'78 Distributing some of the unclaimed funds to Non-
Class Shareholders, who suffer from Credibility and lOb-5 Declines but
have no cause of action under the Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
precedent,'79 might be a related and good use of such funds. 8 Distributing
funds through such a cy pres dividend would mitigate the problem of requir-
ing Non-Class Shareholders to bear all of the costs of compensation. 8'
176. However, any such benefits would be offset by the dividend tax. In order for this pro-
posal to be economically viable, legislation that exempts a dividend that distributes shareholder
compensation from a tax might be necessary.
177. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions, supra note 170, at 419-20 (describing the
difficulty of identifying possible claimants).
178. See, e.g., Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007); De-
mocratic Cent. Comm. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 84 F.3d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
For example, courts have distributed unclaimed settlement funds to charity. E.g., Jones v. Nat'l
Distillers, 56 F Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
179. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
180. Cy pres distributions that have gone to causes unrelated to the litigation such as charities
have been controversial. See, e.g., George Krueger & Judd Serotta, Our Class Action System is
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, at A13 (criticizing distribution of settlement proceeds
to charity). But a dividend distributed to shareholders would be a more relevant use for settlement
funds than a charity donation.
181. On the other hand, such a payment would be more circular than restricting the payment
of funds, claimed and unclaimed, to Class Shareholders. An objection to a cy pres dividend may be
that the Class Shareholders should receive any unclaimed funds because they were the ones who
suffered from a Fundamental Decline. In theory, a cy pres dividend could be limited to those Class
Shareholders who submitted a claim. Such a dividend, however, might lead to overcompensation of
the Class Shareholders.
Another question is whether a cy pres dividend is necessary. In some cases, unclaimed share-
holder-compensation funds could be returned to the company. Those funds could then be invested to
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B. Preemptive Dividends
Exploring the idea further, what if a company could preemptively re-
solve part or all of its liability in a securities-fraud action by paying a
dividend to compensate shareholders? A company could simultaneously
send a stronger signal to investors and compete with plaintiffs' attorneys
who file securities-fraud actions by paying such a "preemptive" dividend to
compensate shareholders. A preemptive dividend could either be paid solely
to Class Shareholders, like a preferred dividend, or to both Class and Non-
Class Shareholders. 1
2
While the board of directors of a company typically makes decisions
with respect to the payment of dividends,'83 the board might have a conflict
of interest with respect to the payment of a preemptive dividend. As dis-
cussed earlier, managers who are board members might have been involved
with the fraud and thus have an incentive not to acknowledge wrongdoing.
Therefore, the decision to pay a preemptive dividend might be better dele-
gated to a committee of independent directors. Such a committee could be
modeled on the special litigation committees formed to assess shareholder-
derivative suitsj 84 or committees that bargain on behalf of minority
shareholders with respect to a freeze out. ' While independent committees
are not always so independent, there is some evidence that they do not al-
ways defer to management.
86
After a securities-fraud action is filed, a board could appoint an inde-
pendent committee to look into the allegations. The appointment of such a
committee in itself might be a signal that the corporation takes allegations of
securities fraud seriously. The independent committee could hire an outside
benefit all shareholders. A cy pres dividend may have the same effect as simply returning the funds,
but with greater transaction costs. In a sense, this question brings us full circle to the issue of
whether companies should pay dividends. There might be some modest diversification and agency-
cost benefits to paying any remaining funds to shareholders rather than returning the funds to the
corporation.
182. A general dividend is more likely because of the difficulty of identifying Class Share-
holders before a case has been resolved.
183. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2001). Board decisions with respect to the payment of
dividends are given a great amount of deference and are protected by the business judgment rule.
See, e.g., David Michael Israel, Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the Declaration of Corpo-
rate Dividends: A Reappraisal, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 73, 73 (1975) ("The application of the business
judgment rule to the declaration of corporate dividends is one of the oldest and most widely ac-
cepted principles of corporation law.").
184. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
185. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
186. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Em-
pirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Working
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 112, 2008), available at http://ssm.comabstract=l 162858 (finding
that special litigation committees do not invariably choose to dismiss derivative suits).
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law firm to do an investigation.' After deliberation, if it determines that the
securities-fraud action has merit, the independent committee could propose
paying a preemptive dividend to Class Shareholders to compensate them for
some or all of the losses. 188 Or, a preemptive dividend could be distributed to
all shareholders if the cost of identifying Class Shareholders is too great. If
the independent committee determines there is no merit to the case, such a
decision might send a signal to shareholders that any Credibility Decline is
not merited.
Courts would reduce any subsequent class recovery in a securities-fraud
action by the amount of any preemptive dividend payment. "9 The Securities
Exchange Act prohibits double recovery for damage caused by securities
fraud, 90 and a preemptive dividend would cover part of the damages from
fraud. 9' Of course, if the harm suffered is greater than the preemptive divi-
dend, a securities-fraud action could be brought to recover the additional
amount. The independent committee would have to consider the risk that if
it pays an amount that is too low, a securities-fraud action would still be
viable.
A preemptive dividend would be similar to a settlement in that it would
not necessarily be an admission of liability by the company. The independ-
ent committee could choose to pay a preemptive dividend not because it
finds that there is liability under the securities laws but because it deter-
mines that there is a basis for compensating shareholders for a loss. For
example, the committee might have concluded that the stock price was in-
187. This would be a separate law firm from the firm retained to defend the company against
the securities-fraud action. The internal investigation conducted by such a firm could be conducted
in a way so that attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine protect information from
disclosure. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the attomey-client privilege covers interviews conducted with corporate employees).
188. The independent directors in making such a decision would be protected from liability
for their decision. Either liability would be precluded, or the decision to pay a preemptive dividend
would be protected by the business judgment rule. As a practical matter, a shareholder who is un-
happy with the decision still has the remedy of the securities-fraud action. Thus, if the independent
committee decides not to pay a preemptive dividend, it would be unlikely that a shareholder would
have a valid derivative action against the committee.
189. A more radical proposal might preclude further liability if a preemptive dividend is paid
as long as the amount of the preemptive dividend is reasonable.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) ("[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
under the provisions of [section 10(b)] shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or
more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.");
see also Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System
and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857,
860 (1985) (noting that in tort suits where plaintiff has received workers compensation, "benefits are
set off against the tort judgment to avoid double recovery").
191. Cf Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 470 F Supp. 173 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (ap-
plying 15 U.S.C. § 78bb to prohibit recovery when plaintiffs received bonds as part of merger worth
more than loss).
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flated but no one acted with scienter. '92 Plaintiffs would not be permitted to
use the fact that a preemptive dividend was paid as evidence in establishing
liability in a subsequent securities-fraud action. In a sense, a preemptive
dividend would allow the company to go around the plaintiffs' lawyers in
resolving a substantial part of the claim, saving shareholders the attorney
fees that they normally pay for a settlement.
A preemptive dividend would differ from a settlement in that it would
not involve managers, insurance companies, and the attorneys defending the
action in the decision to pay. Thus, a preemptive dividend would not reflect
a self-interested cost-benefit analysis by managers involved in the fraud who
can simply get the insurance company to foot the bill. It would not simply
be a decision by an insurance company that the payment is an acceptable
loss. And it would not be a decision by defense attorneys to settle the case to
avoid the risk of a face-saving loss.
The decision to pay a preemptive dividend would thus send a clearer
signal to investors than a settlement. A preemptive dividend would be proac-
tive rather than reactive. By giving independent directors another
mechanism for assessing the conduct of management, a preemptive dividend
might increase their power to act on behalf of shareholders. Because man-
agement is not involved with the decision, a preemptive dividend might
signal that current management is suspect and should be disciplined or re-
placed. An independent committee might also be able to act faster than the
litigation process, addressing the problem that a signal becomes outdated
with the passage of time. Of course, a preemptive dividend might initially
hurt the stock price if it is interpreted as an admission of fraud, but to the
extent that culpable management is replaced or deficient internal controls
are fixed, a corporation could move beyond the fraud. In the future, share-
holders might be more confident that the corporation has good governance
and that there is a reduced chance of fraud in the future.
Importantly, plaintiffs' attorneys would not receive credit for the pre-
emptive dividend. In other words, if a company pays a preemptive dividend
worth $5 million, the shareholders save the 20 percent fee, or $1 million,
that would have been paid if that payment had been obtained through a se-
curities-fraud action. A plaintiffs' attorney would receive a fee only if he
could obtain a settlement above that $5 million payment. If litigation is
avoided, some of the costs of defending a lawsuit might also be saved. 93 Of
course, the shareholder would still be subject to the dividend tax, which may
or may not be higher than the attorney fees and defense costs. In addition, a
preemptive dividend might be more expensive than the net present value of
192. Scienter is a prerequisite to liability under Rule lOb-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
193. As noted earlier, these costs can be substantial. See supra note 16.
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a future settlement. Thus, an independent committee would have to estimate
whether the benefits of a preemptive dividend would outweigh the costs.
Of course, the effect of a preemptive dividend will likely mean that
plaintiffs' attorneys will simply seek higher recoveries, but to do so, they
will have to accept greater amounts of risk. Suppose a plaintiffs' attorney
thinks that there is a 50% chance he can recover up to $5 million for share-
holders, while only a 5% chance that he can recover an additional $2
million. Without a preemptive payment, the plaintiffs' attorney would likely
seek to recover only $5 million. The expected recovery for shareholders
would be $2.5 million (50% of $5 million), and the attorney's expected fee
would be $500,000 (20% of $2.5 million). With a preemptive dividend of $5
million, the plaintiffs' attorney will have to recover more than that amount
to receive a fee. Suppose he argues that shareholders are entitled to an addi-
tional $2 million. The expected additional return for shareholders would be
$100,000 (5% of $2 million), and the attorney's expected fee would be
$20,000 (20% of $100,000). As a result, he may be less likely to pursue the
case with a preemptive dividend, and if he does, he might deserve a fee. 94
The ability to pay a preemptive dividend would essentially make the in-
dependent committee a competitor to the plaintiffs' attorney, which
normally monopolizes the effort to obtain shareholder compensation for
plaintiffs. By creating incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to seek higher re-
coveries for shareholders, the problem that shareholders receive only a
fraction of their losses might be partially addressed. To the extent that a
plaintiffs' attorney obtains a significantly higher payment after a preemptive
dividend, it is clearer that the plaintiffs' attorney has added value to the
process. In a world without preemptive dividends, to the extent that a securi-
ties-fraud action has merit and will generate a significant settlement, a
plaintiffs' attorney can earn a substantial fee for essentially being named
class counsel. In some circumstances, plaintiffs' attorneys are fungible, and
the company would pay a certain amount regardless of who is representing
the class. It is in these circumstances that an independent committee would
have the greatest incentive to pay a preemptive dividend. If it is likely to
have to pay a certain amount anyway, the company might as well stop plain-
tiffs' attorneys from taking 20-30 percent of the settlement.
Of course, a significant disadvantage of the preemptive dividend is that
it would not provide the finality of a class-action settlement. Thus, a pre-
emptive dividend will be more attractive in cases where there is reasonable
certainty about the amount of recoverable damages. When the recoverable
damages are potentially much higher than the corporation is willing to pay
out as a preemptive dividend, the corporation might be better off proceeding
194. Plaintiffs' attorneys may have an incentive to settle cases for too little because they are
risk averse. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing The Private Attorney General: Why The Model
Of The LawyerAs Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 230-32 (1983).
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with a class action settlement. When the recoverable damages are within the
range of what the corporation is able to pay out as a preemptive dividend, a
preemptive dividend might be a better way to proceed.
Because it is not a judgment or settlement, the cost of the preemptive
dividend would likely not be covered by the insurance policy that would
normally cover the cost of a securities-fraud action. Because the preemp-
tive dividend would not be paid by insurance, a preemptive dividend might
be more costly in the short run than settlement of a class action. Thus, a pre-
emptive dividend might be more appropriate for a well-established company
with easy access to the capital markets than for a cash-poor start-up.
In the long run, however, a preemptive dividend might not be as costly
given that insurance premiums typically rise in response to a settlement
while they might not rise in response to a preemptive dividend. If preemp-
tive dividends become common, insurance premiums overall might decline
as settlements that would normally be funded by insurance companies are
replaced by preemptive dividends. Moreover, to the extent that it thwarts
strike suits, a preemptive dividend might save a substantial amount in litiga-
tion costs, also in the long run reducing insurance premiums.
What of the Class Shareholders who decide to sell their stock before a
preemptive dividend is paid? Such selling Class Shareholders would not
receive a preemptive dividend and so their only remedy would have to come
through a securities-fraud action. This might further lessen any finality that
could be achieved by a preemptive dividend. One solution might be to allow
selling Class Shareholders to collect a pro rata share of a preemptive divi-
dend by submitting a claim. If they do not, they can be considered to have
waived any claim for additional shareholder compensation.
Another problem with the preemptive dividend is that it might lead to a
chilling effect where plaintiffs' attorneys would not bring shareholder suits
in the first place.'" If there is a substantial risk that they will not receive a
return from their investment, it is unlikely that plaintiffs' attorneys will
spend resources in developing good cases, and it might be less likely that
fraud would be discovered. But if a plaintiffs' attorney does develop a good
case with solid evidence, there will be a stronger case for obtaining damages
greater than the amount of the preemptive dividend. Independent
195. As a result, a preemptive dividend might not be as effective in spreading losses. Accord-
ingly, it might make sense to limit use of a preemptive dividend to cases where the need for a strong
signal is more compelling than the need for loss spreading.
196. One problem could arise if an independent committee could pay a preemptive dividend
after plaintiffs' attorneys have litigated a case for years, incurring substantial costs that might not be
reimbursed. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (expressing con-
cern that special litigation committee had been formed four years after start of litigation). But that
may simply be part of the risk of bringing a securities-fraud action. Plaintiffs' attorneys would have
to assess the risk of a preemptive dividend in bringing suit. And if the case is strong, plaintiffs' at-
tomeys might still have some leverage if the dividend does not cover the full amount of damages
suffered by Class Shareholders.
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committees may be wary of paying too much, and so the amount of the
dividend may not cover all of the potential damages.' 9' Plaintiffs' attorneys
will likely argue that more compensation is necessary in cases with merit
and more likely to take on the risk that their payment will be reduced
through a preemptive dividend. As a result, damages may be ratcheted up in
cases with merit while ratcheted down in cases without merit.
An additional issue is the possibility of gamesmanship. For example, a
company might simply pay a dividend that it was already planning on pay-
ing. Such a dividend would not compensate shareholders for losses caused
by the fraud. Such a tactic might be prevented by requiring any preemptive
dividend to be in addition to any dividend that the company normally pays.
Shareholders and plaintiffs' attorneys might be permitted to challenge
whether a purportedly preemptive dividend can be considered compensation
for a securities fraud on the ground that the company would have paid such
a dividend anyway.
Coupled with other reforms, such as clarifying the applicable law,' 98 a
preemptive dividend might help save the securities-fraud action as a mean-
ingful tool in deterring fraud and protecting investors. The possibility of a
preemptive dividend would give companies an alternative to stonewalling
and delay in response to meritorious securities-fraud actions. A preemptive
dividend would allow the company through its independent directors to send
a strong signal that it will treat allegations of fraud seriously rather than act-
ing defensively. A preemptive dividend might be a way of remedying the
weak signal sent by traditional shareholder-compensation payments, which
are made by insurance companies after years of litigation. By making such a
payment, companies may be able to save some transaction costs while re-
versing part of the Credibility Decline.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder compensation is more of a puzzle than a problem. The cir-
cularity problem is just a variation of the long-standing question of why
companies pay dividends. At the very least, shareholder compensation is no
more circular than a dividend. And indeed, shareholder compensation is less
circular than a dividend. Shareholder compensation benefits Class Share-
holders who happen to have purchased stock at a time when the price was
197. In addition, there will always be companies who deny that they have done anything
wrong and refuse to pay a preemptive dividend. To the extent that plaintiffs' attorneys do not know
ex ante which companies will fight and which will pay a preemptive dividend, they will have incen-
tives to file suits, though they might be more selective about doing so.
198. For example, the standard for determining what statements are considered to be material
should be further clarified. See Park, supra note 25. Limiting damages to the Fundamental Decline
might also help make securities-fraud actions more manageable. See supra note 64 and accompany-
ing text. Finally, plaintiff and defense attorney fees relating to securities-fraud actions should also be
reduced. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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fraudulently inflated and is funded by Non-Class Shareholders who did not.
This transfer is justified by the importance of compensating investors who
suffer from Fundamental Declines.
Shareholder compensation is a loss-spreading mechanism that spreads
the risk of fraud among shareholders. Shareholder compensation, which
protects markets, is a necessary supplement to diversification, which pro-
tects individual investors. Shareholder compensation protects markets by
helping to reduce the fraud discount that an investor would incorporate into
the price of the stock. Insurance markets spread the costs of this mandatory
insurance scheme among even more parties, and may be a more efficient
way of spreading losses than a system that relies solely on diversification.
Some of the reasons for paying dividends have some applicability to
shareholder compensation, though the analogy has limits. By reducing free
cash flow, shareholder compensation can reduce agency costs and discipline
managers who have demonstrated that they are in need of oversight. The
signaling effect of any shareholder compensation tends to be ambiguous at
best, while any diversification effect is trivial.
Shareholder compensation might better capture the signaling benefit if it
is distributed as a preemptive dividend. In doing so, a corporation can send a
clearer message to investors that it treats securities fraud seriously and is
acting in the best interest of shareholders. Allowing corporations to resolve
securities-fraud actions through a preemptive dividend might remedy the
problems of a system where plaintiffs' attorneys may benefit more from se-
curities-fraud actions than the shareholders.
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